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ABSTRACT
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING AND PROVISION IN AN
INSTITUTIONALLY CONSTRAINED DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM: THE CASE OF
AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION IN UGANDA
By
ABDU MUWONGE
May, 2007
Committee Chair: Dr. Sally Wallace
Major Department: Economics

Decentralization is a key governance reform which many developing countries
have embarked on. Local governments are expected to use their informational advantage
to improve the delivery of public goods. This result implied by Tiebout’s (1956) model
requires fully informed citizens who “vote with their feet.” The model’s application to
developing countries has been limited, since local decisions may not be responsive to
local demands.
Practitioners are shifting to innovations that minimize institutional constraints so
that decentralized programs can lead to improved outcomes. Examples of such innovative
ways include decentralized agricultural extension programs, which embrace farmers’
empowerment, local government, and private sector participation.
Few impact evaluation studies on agricultural extension have combined
qualitative and quantitative methods. This dissertation contributes to the literature by
applying these methods and survey data to study the impact of a decentralized extension
program in Uganda, known as the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) on
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the value of farm production per acre. The program is non-randomly assigned to local
governments and farmers self-select in or out within participating sub-counties.
Using a sample of 305 participating and non-participating farmers and local
government assessment indicators as instruments, we cannot reject the null that the
NAADS program has had an impact. The 2SLS results show no program impact;
however, the OLS results show that the program had a positive impact on the value of
farm production per acre of about 20 percent. Qualitative results show that NAADS
farmers: participate in local decision making processes through farmers’ institutions;
have increased knowledge on farming; and practice enterprise diversification. The
quantitative finding must be treated with caution; for example, the study did not account
for spillover effects.
The NAADS program faces challenges inherent in Uganda’s decentralized
structure; particularly the low financial and human capacity, and the weak monitoring at
the local level.
The policy implications include: the need to strengthen farmers’ institutions;
development of a marketing strategy; clear policy guidelines for local government
support to NAADS; improved coordination of NAADS activities among line ministries;
need for additional resources for NAADS activities; and improved capacity of service
providers.

xiv

1
CHAPTER ONE. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
Introduction
Decentralization is among the key governance reforms which many developing
countries have embarked on (Bardhan, 2002). Decentralization has many different
aspects including allowing local government representatives to be selected through local
elections (political decentralization), transferring authority and responsibility for service
delivery to local governments (administrative decentralization) and shifting authority to
raise adequate revenues and to make expenditure decisions to the local level (fiscal
decentralization) (Litvack, Ahmad, & Bird, 1998).1 Decentralization is viewed by its
proponents as a way to make government more responsive and efficient (Oates, 1999).
Lower levels of government are increasingly involved in the implementation of
decentralized programs with the hope that, by being closer to the beneficiaries, the local
governments can use their informational advantage to improve the provision of public
goods.
The Tiebout (1956) model sets the stage for studying the economics of local
public goods provision. The model assumes mobility of the population, implying that
fully informed citizens “vote with their feet” in response to differential public
performance. Despite its implications for local public good provision in the context of
developed countries, the model’s applicability to developing countries has been criticized
(Bahl & Linn, 1992).
1

There are three main forms of decentralization, namely: deconcentration, delegation and devolution.
Deconcentration occurs when lower levels of government (e.g., regional or municipal) execute functions
on behalf of the central government without having decision making authority. Delegation is the process in
which the central government transfers decision making over certain functions to relatively autonomous
local governments, which have limited autonomy and are ultimately responsible to the central government.
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Thus, adapting the theory of fiscal federalism in developing countries has meant
that practitioners have had to rethink the notion that under decentralization allocated
funds reach their intended beneficiaries (Bardhan, 2002) and that the demand for local
public goods is actually met. Decentralized programs are confronted with institutional
constraints such as corruption, weak public management systems, information
asymmetries, inadequate manpower, high administrative costs, local capture by the
elite/politicians, and soft budget constraints.2 These constraints work to impede the
realization of central government objectives such as poverty reduction through targeted
decentralized programs for a variety of services ranging from social service provision
(e.g., education, health) to physical infrastructure and agricultural extension.
More recently, the theory of fiscal federalism has been extended to incorporate
institutional constraints in the context of political agency models (Qian & Weingast,
1997; Lin & Nugent, 1995).These models explain, for example, how the electorate (as
principals) may be less informed than the elected representatives (agents) or the center
(as a principal) may be less informed than the sub-national governments (agents) about
the local needs, delivery costs and the amount of the public good actually delivered
(Bardhan, 2002; Betancourt & Gleason, 2000). The informed sub-national government
officials may malevolently use their informational advantage to capture the program (e.g.,
as shown by Reinikka & Svensson, 2004) or may collude with other special interest
groups such as s (PSPs) sub-contracted to provide services to the poor (e.g., delegation of
local public works problem analyzed by Besfamille, 2004a, (2004b). In these cases

Devolution involves the complete transfer of decision making over finance and management of public
services to quasi-autonomous local government units.
2
The World Development Report (2004) discusses the consequences of such constraints on service
delivery as well as the mechanisms to mitigate them (World Bank, 2004).
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imperfect information and the lack of accountability undermine the potential benefits of a
decentralized approach to service provision. In Besfamille’s (2004a; 2004b) analysis,
local public works construction is delegated to local authorities, which in turn subcontract the construction of local roads to private firms. The local authorities may
exaggerate the jurisdictional preferences for the project during administrative procedures
that allocate the federal grant. In that framework, incentive problems arise because the
local authority may have some interests in the project’s effective undertaking and so may
inflate its cost, the efficiency of the contractor or even the expected benefit of the project
to society.
To mitigate the consequences of such institutional constraints, innovative
programs of improving decentralized service delivery in rural areas in developing areas
are emerging. These include decentralized agricultural extension programs, whose aims
include increasing agricultural productivity and household incomes of farmers and thus
assist in reducing poverty by empowering beneficiaries to demand the “right” advisory
services and to hold accountable the service providers (Chapman & Tripp, 2003; World
Bank., 2005a). As noted by Birkhaeuser & Evenson (1991) and Evenson (2001) effective
agricultural extension can bridge the gap between discoveries in the science laboratory
and changes in the individual farmer’s fields. In addition to information about cropping
techniques, optimal input use, high yield varieties, and prices, extensionists can inform
farmers about improved record keeping and assist in the development of their
management skills, thus facilitating a shift to more efficient methods of production.
Unlike the 1970s and 1980s, agricultural extension systems worldwide are
increasingly decentralized with the private sector increasingly involved in the provision
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of extension services (World Bank, 2005a). However, the public sector maintains the
funding function at least during the early stages of implementation of extension
programs.3 The programs incorporate bottom-up approaches grounded on the principals
of farmer empowerment to own local decision making processes including nurturing their
ability to demand extension services and to hold accountable the administrators and
providers of extension (Rivera & Zijp, 2002). This shift is in sharp contrast to the
traditional agricultural extension programs including the Training and Visit (T and V)
system that involved public funding and provision and lacked bottom-up participatory
approaches (Antholt, 1998).
By targeted programs we mean programs that are designed to address the
concerns (e.g., welfare) of specific groups of people, notably the poor or the marginalized
(Ravallion, 2006). Targeted programs implicitly recognize the fact that decentralization
alone may not lead to improved service delivery if, for example, program beneficiaries
are not empowered to counter the institutional constraints. By empowerment, the local
beneficiaries of decentralized programs actively participate in the decision making
processes that lead to the provision and/or the financing of the services such as
agricultural extension. This arrangement makes the local authorities accountable to the
local people and thus, may minimize program capture and collusive behavior that may
lead to inefficient outcomes in service delivery. In addition, by tailoring services to local
needs, outcomes from government programs may improve-thus contributing to poverty
reduction. Examples of such decentralized and privatized agricultural extension programs
are currently running in Latin America (e.g., in Chile, Venezuela, Honduras) and in Asia

3

As a pure public good, there is always a justification for the public sector to intervene, since the private
sector may not efficiently provide the extension public good.
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(India and Pakistan) (World Bank, 2005a). However, little is known about the impact of
such decentralized agricultural extension programs. This thesis contributes to the
literature by addressing this gap.
We evaluate the impact of a targeted decentralized agricultural advisory services
program in Uganda known as the NAADS, which was created as an independent
institution by Act of Parliament in November, 2001 and charged with the objective of
revamping Uganda’s agricultural productivity through the provision of decentralized,
demand-driven and privately-provided advisory services to the farmers (Republic of
Uganda, 2000a). At its inception, six districts namely, Arua, Kabale, Kibaale, Mukono,
Soroti and Tororo were selected to pilot the NAADS.4 By 2005, the NAADS program
had covered 37 districts in 344 sub-counties out of about 857 sub-counties in 76 districts
in Uganda (Republic of Uganda, 2005c). 5 The program rolls out to new districts and subcounties on a fiscal year basis in line with Uganda’s budget cycle and accounting
framework, the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). It is expected that
NAADS will cover the entire country by 2008 (Republic of Uganda, 2005c). Among the
key design features of NAADS are emphasizing participatory processes by empowering
farmer groups to demand advisory services, targeting the “poor”, shifting the focal point
of service delivery to local governments in line with the broader reform of
decentralization, and the contractual arrangements for advisory services between farmers’
groups and the PSPs (Republic of Uganda, 2000a).

4

These districts were chosen based on specific criteria that included the local government assessment
indicators measuring how well a district manages previous or other ongoing government programs. The
criteria included the availability and quality of development plan, the degree of communication and
accountability mechanisms, local revenue performance, and availability of monitoring and evaluation
mechanisms. Other factors considered include the agricultural potential of the district.
5
Number includes only rural sub-counties.
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There are important reasons why we choose to study agricultural extension in
Uganda and moreover, within a decentralization framework. Uganda is predominantly an
agro-based economy with agriculture contributing about 40 percent of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), of which over 60 percent is composed of food crops. The sector is a
source of livelihood to more than 80 percent of the population in Uganda (World Bank.,
2005b). The bulk of agriculture is smallholder agriculture with the majority poor farmers
who grow mainly for subsistence. In addition, the 1999 Uganda National Household
Survey (UNHS) evidence indicated that agriculture accounted for more than two-thirds of
households’ earned income. Since poverty in Uganda is mainly a rural phenomenon, with
the rural areas predominantly agro-based, policy interventions that mitigate the
constraints to agricultural productivity are crucial to poverty reduction.6 Moreover,
Uganda’s high potential to provide food security to its population and to the East African
region is expected to boost its quest for sustained economic growth and structural
transformation (Republic of Uganda, 2001a, 2001b).
The transformation of the agricultural sector is faced with problems such as the
lack of skilled labor, limited research and extension services, poor technology, lack of
purchased inputs, and low capital (Republic of Uganda, 2000a, 2000d). With reference to
agricultural extension services, Reinikka & Collier ( 2001) noted that extension services
remained limited and only one-third of the communities studied in the 1999 UNHS had
reported having been served by an extension worker. Although additional survey

6

Based on UNHS data, the proportion of people below the poverty line in urban areas has declined from
27.8 percent in 1992 to 9.6 percent in 1999/2000. However, this proportion increased to 12. 2 percent in
2002/2003. On the other hand, the proportion of the people below the poverty line in rural areas was 59.7
percent in 1992, declined to 37.4 percent in 1999/2000, before increasing to 41.1 percent in 2002/2003. The
proportion of crop farmers below the poverty line was 50 percent in 2002/2003 (Republic of Uganda,
2005).
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evidence revealed that the coverage of extension services increased from 11 percent of
farmers in 1992 to 17 percent in 1999, it was noted that only 5 percent of producers at the
national level had reported contact with an extension worker more than twice a year
(Deininger & Okidi, 2001). The authors further found that at the village level, about 64
percent of the respondents reported that the community was not at all reached by
extension services. In addition, in all regions of Uganda households relied more on radio
than on extension workers for information on technology. Owing in part to dismal
performance of extension services during the 1990s, agricultural productivity has been
limited. Deininger & Okidi (2001) suggested that in addition to the investment in human
capital and infrastructure including improved access to markets, there was a great need
for improved availability and awareness about agricultural technologies through research
and extension.
Despite the challenges facing the agricultural sector, the Ugandan economy
registered real GDP growth rates averaging 5.98 percent over the period 1996-2004. The
agriculture sector accounted for 38.7 percent of GDP in 2002/03, as compared to 51.1
percent in 1991/92 and poverty was reduced from 56 percent in 1992 to 34 percent in
1999/2000 (Republic of Uganda, 2001b). However, recent analysis based on the 2003
UNHS suggests that poverty increased from 34 percent to 38 percent between 1999/2000
and 2002/03 (Republic of Uganda, 2003). The increase in poverty is particularly marked
for households in crop agriculture (Republic of Uganda, 2005b). It is argued that among
the factors explaining the rise in poverty is less investment to the productive sectors,
particularly agriculture (Nabbumba & Kuteesa, 2004). Agriculture had the slowest
growth rate amongst the major sectors, averaging 3.8 percent per annum between
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1990/91 and 2002/03, although growth was slightly higher in the last five years, at 4.4
percent per annum.
Against this background, the Uganda Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP)
(Republic of Uganda, 2000e, 2001b, 2005c) lays out the different sectoral interventions
aimed at poverty eradication (Republic of Uganda, 2005c). With respect to the
agricultural sector, the Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture (PMA) lays out seven
key components to address problems such as inadequate markets and credit access as
well as inadequate agricultural extension services and poor agricultural practices among
Uganda’s farmers. The aim of the PMA is the transformation of subsistence agriculture
into commercial agriculture through agricultural advisory services, agricultural research
and extension, agricultural marketing and processing, rural finance, agricultural
education, natural resource management, and physical supportive infrastructure (Republic
of Uganda, 2000a). This study focuses on agricultural advisory services with reference to
the NAADS program since of all the seven components, the NAADS is arguably the
most important innovation under the PMA (Omamo, 2005) and one that has actually
taken off much more in terms of implementation (Republic of Uganda, 2005c).
Another reason for studying NAADS is that estimating the impact of the NAADS
program is relevant for analyzing the modernization of Uganda’s decentralized
agricultural extension. Prior to the decentralization program which commenced in 1993,
the central government was in charge of service delivery arrangements including
agricultural extension. With decentralized governance over the 1990s, agricultural
extension was decentralized to the local government level; however, just like the
centralized extension programs, farmers could not access the extension services due to
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absenteeism from extensionists, selectivity to reach out to rich farmers, and the fact that
the program was generally not cost-effective for farmers (Republic of Uganda, 2000a,
2000c, 2001a).
The innovative decentralized approach to agricultural extension via NAADS is
expected to result in better agricultural outcomes for farmers versus the traditional
centralized approaches because it is based on a bottom-top approach that incorporates
farmers’ empowerment. Therefore, the NAADS program was introduced to redress past
misfortunes of agricultural extension and to deliver on the expectations of transforming
agriculture from being subsistence to being commercial in line with the PMA.
The NAADS program has a mission to increase farmer access to information,
knowledge and technology for profitable agricultural production over 25 years (Republic
of Uganda, 2000a). The first phase begun in the fiscal year 2001/2002 and will end in
2007/2008. The cost of the first phase is estimated at about 108 million U.S. dollars.7 The
main sources of the funds are donors (these include the International Development
Association (IDA), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD),
Department for International Development (DFID), European Union (EU), the
Netherland International Assistance and the Irish Aid), the Government of Uganda,
participating local governments (districts and sub-counties) and participating farmers.
The program is funded from a common basket to which participating stakeholders
channel their contributions. The donors provide about 80 percent of the NAADS budget
followed by the Government of Uganda with a contribution of 8 percent. The local

7

As a percentage of the 2002/2003 total public expenditure in the amount of 2352 U.S. million dollars, the
entire first phase cost of NAADS would constitute approximately 5 percent.
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governments and farmers associations contribute 10 percent and 2 percent respectively
(Republic of Uganda, 2000c, 2001a).
Over the 25 year horizon, the farmers and local government shares in the NAADS
budget are expected to increase. However, this rests on the assumption that the current
efforts under NAADS will result in a sustained boost in agricultural productivity to raise
farmers’ income and thus, command purchases of advisory services with little or no
financial dependence from the other stakeholders.
As noted above, several unique design features about NAADS make it relevant to
study its impact as a decentralized program. First, the selection of participating districts
and sub-counties is in part based on local government assessment indicators for
decentralized governance. Districts and sub-counties performing “relatively” well in
terms of accountability, local revenue generation and allocation, monitoring and
evaluation and quality of local development plan are more likely to be chosen into the
NAADS program. Second, successfully chosen districts and sub-counties receive central
conditional transfers earmarked for agricultural and advisory services. The chosen
districts and sub-counties prepare annual budgets for NAADS activities and submit them
to the NAADS secretariat, which then triggers the release of the transfers from the
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) (Republic of
Uganda, 2000c, 2001a).
Third and very critical to the success of the NAADS program is that the subcounties, the lowest administrative units in Uganda’s decentralization, are the main units
of program implementation (Republic of Uganda, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d, 2001a).
The Local Government Resistance Council Statute (1993), the Constitution of the
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Republic of Uganda (1995), the Local Governments Act (1997), the Local Government
Financial and Accounting Regulations (1998), and the Local Government Finance
Commission Act (2003) mandate the local governments as the main units of
decentralized service delivery.
As recognized by the FAO and World Bank.(2000), local governments may be an
appropriate unit for service delivery implementation if they have adequate capacity and
are accountable to the local population. In line with increased administrative and fiscal
decentralization, sub-counties receive over 75 percent of the financial allocation of the
total NAADS budget. The sub-county funds are earmarked to NAADS activities
including contracting of PSPs, technology development, and capacity building in
participatory planning, monitoring and evaluation.
Fourth, the formation of farmers’ groups, the establishment of democratic voting
processes to elect farmers’ representatives at the sub-county farmers’ forum (SFF), and
the participatory approaches to selection of viable and profitable enterprises to invest in,
increases the empowerment of farmers. In 2005, a total of 13,202 farmer groups were
registered in the NAADS program and engaged in enterprise development and promotion
(Republic of Uganda, 2004a). The enterprises selected are usually farmer-group specific
and thus one would expect variation in enterprises selected within a participating subcounty. Enterprise choice ranges from improved crop varieties to high breed animal
rearing to aquaculture to bee keeping, among others.
The farmers’ representatives and farmers’ groups are expected to ensure that the
PSPs are accountable and deliver according to the contractual obligations. The premise is
that if farmers adopt the better methods of farming, better agricultural outcomes such as
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high crop yields, quality animal products, technology access and adoption, use of
fertilizers, manure and pesticides, better marketing and farmer organizational skills-will
result.
From both a theoretical and practical perspective, several issues emerge with
respect to the implementation and impact of the decentralized NAADS program. These
include: first, do the subnational government authorities have an incentive to misreport
the progress on implementation of NAADS activities within their sub-counties or
misreport annual budgets or even misreport the efficiency of the PSPs in case they
collude in the anticipation of some gains-rent seeking? Second, do the sub-counties’
authorities monitor the NAADS activities to ensure the PSPs deliver according to the
contractual obligations? Third, are the farmers informed enough to identify the farming
enterprises that will eventually improve their agricultural outcomes? Fourth, are the
farmers’ representatives benevolent, and, if so, how do they possibly check on the
“potential collusion” between the sub-counties and the PSPs? Further, do the sub-county
authorities and PSPs have the required capacity to manage and implement the NAADS
program? What measures are in place to protect the contractual obligations of the
NAADS services? Given that sub-counties coordinate the processes of NAADS including
the mobilization of farmers groups at inception, do farmers’ perceptions about the subcounty management affect their decision of whether to participate in NAADS or not? If
the records at the participating sub-counties indicate that PSPs have delivered the
advisory services, are the farmers satisfied with the quality of the services provided? And
overall, what is the impact of access to advisory services among participating farmers?
Unfortunately, our study does not explicitly address all these questions, except the impact
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question. Yet the absence of program impact may partly be explained by the institutional
constraints mentioned above.
Answering the impact question is an important but intricate issue. Quantifying the
impact requires that one accounts for the non-random program placement and selfselection in and out of the program and at the same time recognize the possibility of
spillover effects to non-participants (Ravallion, 2006) and the intra-group correlations
common in cross sectional data collected in clustered localities (Deaton, 1997;
Wooldridge, 2002). In addition, detailed data not only on agricultural outcomes and their
determinants is required but also one must understand the broader program institutional
framework (Ravallion, 2003). Although, some of the theoretical questions above such as
informational asymmetries are non-trivial to test empirically, the use of qualitative
techniques can give clues about the processes, although they cannot provide causation
(Rao & Woolcook, 2003). An attempt to answer such questions is made in Chapter 4.
It is important to place this research in the context of previous work on
decentralized service delivery in Uganda. Previous empirical work has mainly focused on
the impact of decentralization on education and health service delivery (see for example,
Hutchinson, 1999; Reinikka & Collier, 2001). Hutchinson (1999) notes that despite the
decentralization of health service provision, the impact of decentralization on health
service delivery and health outcomes is not clear. While decentralization has reportedly
increased public participation in the health sector, new problems such as the decline in
childhood immunization coverage demonstrated the difficulties of incorporating formerly
vertical programs into a decentralized system, particularly if local priorities differed from
the national ones. Reinikka & Collier (2001) studied the impact of decentralization on the
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flow of public funds to primary schools in Uganda and found that decentralization
adversely affected the flow of funds. The schools affected by decentralization received,
on average, 9 percentage points less of the intended capitation grant per student.
Although survey results indicated some improvement in input flow such as in teacher
salaries, they also confirm that serious accountability problems remained in 1995. District
authorities captured most of the nonwage public funds intended for schools.
The study by Deininger & Mpuga (2005) provides a general analysis of the extent
of accountability in decentralized public service delivery in Uganda; However, no
analysis with respect to decentralized extension is available, most likely due to the
unavailability of data.
Altogether these studies contribute to our understanding of the impact of
decentralized service delivery in the presence of institutional constraints such as local
capture, limited manpower and corruption. In fact, policy dialogue in Uganda has
embraced some of these studies’ findings and as a result, some changes have been in
acted to improve service delivery; although the quality of services (in health and
education) remains a challenge (Republic of Uganda, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d).
The present study does not study whether local capture or corruption or
inadequate manpower affect the NAADS program if at all they do exist; but instead, we
ask the broader question of what is the impact of access to advisory services under the
NAADS program. If we find no impact, assuming we have accounted for the potential
econometric problems, then we may ask whether the absence of impact might be
attributable to the presence of institutional constraints. The qualitative approaches offer
some insights on the challenges of the NAADS program. For example, the Joint
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Assessment Review of Decentralization (JARD) recognized the sluggish integration of
NAADS activities into local government structures. Some of the local government
officials do not accord the same weight to NAADS activities as they do to other activities
(Republic of Uganda, 2005c). This not only affects the overall implementation of
NAADS, but also its impact.
This dissertation is based on fieldwork that was carried out in Uganda between
September 2005 and April 2006. To answer the research question, a household
questionnaire (see Table A1) integrating household, community and NAADS program
characteristics as well as a modified agriculture module based on the Living Standards
Measurement Survey (LSMS) adopted from Reardon & Glewwe (2000a, 2000b) that was
implemented in selected NAADS and non-NAADS sub-counties in Uganda. Data were
collected on agricultural outcomes and the factors affecting these outcomes, political
level indicators of local government performance, farmers’ participation in the local
electoral process, health and family background characteristics data (including education
and family size), basic housing and asset data. We study the impact of access to advisory
services on the value of farm production per acre as the agricultural outcome of interest.
The value of household production is defined as the value of crop production and the
value of animals reared per farm land cultivated by the farmer. We expect that controlling
for other factors, participation into the NAADS program increases the value of household
production, as a measure of agricultural productivity.
The survey concentrated on 3 NAADS districts (Treatments) namely Kabale,
Mukono, and Tororo and 1 non-NAADS district (Control) namely Kayunga (Map 1). The
NAADS districts were drawn out of the initial six NAADS districts that piloted the

16
NAADS in 2001/2002. Within each NAADS district, one NAADS sub-county was drawn
out of the initial NAADS sub-counties that begun with the NAADS in 2001/2002. For
control purposes, the survey was also executed in one non-NAADS sub-county within
each NAADS district. A total of 305 farmers, 127 of whom are NAADS farmers, were
interviewed. In addition, to the quantitative survey, qualitative methods were applied
before and after the survey to address NAADS specific issues.
The estimation methods are based on instrumental variable (IV) methods to
estimate the impact of the NAADS on participating farmers. The local government
assessment indicators are potential candidates for IVs considered in the placement
decisions. The presumption is that these variables do not affect the agricultural outcome
of interest. However, we face the problem that some factors that affect the placement
decision are correlated with the outcome of interest. For example, the agro-potential of
the sub-county is a candidate in choosing whether a particular sub-county joins NAADS
or not.
This study has limitations. In attempting to study the impacts of contract
extension on improving the livelihoods of the participating farmers, there is a need to go
beyond the impact on agricultural outcomes. A complete framework would require
collecting not only agricultural related data, but also consumption and expenditure and
non-farm enterprise data. This exercise if accomplished can enable the calculation of
extension impacts on poverty for those participating in the NAADS program.
Unfortunately, due to time and budget constraints, it was not possible to extend the
present study to collect consumption and expenditure data. Doing so would imply
extending the scope of the present study to a large-scale survey.
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This study found a positive and statistically significant impact of the NAADS
program on the value of the farm production per acre. Estimation results indicate that
NAADS has had a 20 percent increase in the value of farm production per acre among
NAADS farmers. The factors that might help explain this result include: (i) the fact that
NAADS farmers participate in the local decision making processes governing the
NAADS program, (ii) the development of farmer institutions aligned to the farmers’
investment interests at the village level; (iii) increased knowledge through participatory
processes; (iv) the ability for farmers to diversify their enterprise choice and the use of
hybrid crop varieties and animals; and (iv) increased access to practical knowledge and
skills through localized technology development sites. This finding must be treated with
caution. Our study did not account for spillover effects, other general equilibrium effects,
and we might have applied weak instruments. Further research will be required to
validate our results.
Despite the positive impact of NAADS on the value of farm production per acre,
we find that there are factors outside of the NAADS program and those inherent in the
current system of NAADS that might impede further gains from NAADS program. The
NAADS program faces challenges inherent in Uganda’s decentralized structure;
particularly the lack of adequate financial resources, low human capacity and inadequate
monitoring of government programmes. In addition, the program suffers from the lack of
competent individual PSPs, and a need to strengthen farmers’ institutions. There are also
problems of inadequate funding from the central government as well as delays in
disbursement of financial resources, particularly at the local level.
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The key policy messages for the government of Uganda are the need to strengthen
farmer institutions through provision of relevant training to strengthen farmer
empowerment. There is need for a comprehensive marketing strategy that works
alongside NAADS to improve the marketing chain so that farmers understand farming as
a business. There is urgent need for a clear policy guideline for local government support
to NAADS activities and increased coordination of NAADS activities among the relevant
line ministries. The policy guideline should clearly consider the mechanisms to improve
local fiscal capacity and thus, the co-financing obligations of local governments. There is
need to strengthen the skills of existing service providers through training problems;
however, there is need to be aware of the PSP turnover problem and how to minimize it.

Organization of the study
The rest of the study is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature on
decentralization of agricultural extension and also describes the implementation of the
NAADS program. Emphasis is laid on the role of the farmers, sub-county authorities and
PSPs in the implementation of the NAADS programs at the sub-county level. Chapter 3
presents the methodology applied to generate the data used for analysis. Chapter 4
presents both the quantitative and qualitative empirical findings. We begin by presenting
the quantitative results, and then present the qualitative results. Chapter 5 summarizes the
empirical findings and discusses their policy implications in the implementation of the
NAADS program.
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CHAPTER TWO. DECENTRALIZED APPROACHES TO AGRICULTURAL
EXTENSION

Introduction
The goal of this chapter is to review the relationships between decentralization
and agricultural extension and to discuss how the NAADS program works. We draw
upon the central government (principal)-local government and farmer’s organizations
(supervisors)-PSP (agent) conceptual framework to describe the design and operation of
the NAADS as a decentralized agricultural advisory services provision program.
Agro-based developing countries are increasingly implementing decentralized,
demand-driven participatory approaches to agricultural extension service delivery that
put the farmers (clients) at the forefront (Chapman & Tripp, 2003; World Bank., 2005a).
This gradual shift away from publicly funded/publicly provided extension toward
publicly funded/privately provided extension, also known as contract extension, is a
response in the search for service delivery mechanisms that are not only cost-effective,
but also more responsive to the beneficiaries of the programs (Rivera & Zijp, 2002;
Rivera, Zijp, & Alex, 2002).8 This is similar to the argument for decentralization in the
public finance literature.
During the 1970s and 1980s, there was little potential for producer organizations
(POs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to be involved in the development
process (World Bank., 2000a). In addition, local governments could not provide public
services such as agricultural services because the authority and financing needed to do so
8

In this study we use extension to mean agricultural extension.
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were with centralized government agencies. More generally, the traditional central
extension systems were not responsive to the needs of different types of farmers, not
accountable to farmers and included little or no farmer participation and were
unsustainable (Anderson & Hoff, 1993; Antholt, 1998; Feder & Slade, 1993).
More recently, the roles of the state are changing with sub-national governments,
private sector, POs, NGOs, and Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) involved in the
execution of decentralized contract extension programs. The shift is in sharp contrast to
the traditional view that equated public goods to government provision (Besley &
Ghatak, 2006).
In countries with decentralized extension systems (e.g., Chile, Estonia, Uganda,
and Venezuela) the central government continues to fund extension programs at least
during the early years of implementation and usually delegates the operations of
extension through semi-autonomous agencies charged with extension services (World
Bank., 2005a). In addition, the central government puts in place an enabling environment
in terms of macroeconomic stability, provision of technical and regulatory structures and
coordinating strategies for poverty reduction (Farrington, 1995; Farrington, Christoplos,
Kidd, & Beckman, 2002; Hubbard, 1995).
However, the private sector (both for profit and not-for profit) NGOs and CBOs
are increasingly involved in the provision of extension services through contracting. It is
recognized that NGOs/CBOs can be effective in reaching poor communities and remote
areas at low cost, as they may be more inclined to identify local needs and promote
participation, and that engaging these grassroots based organizations in projects and
policy dialogue can improve project design, implementation and sustainability (World
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Bank., 2005a). The reasons explaining why the NGOs/CBOs may have the incentive to
be more responsive include their long experience working with rural communities or the
desire to accomplish their parent organizations mandates, including fighting rural
poverty.
Because local governments are closer to the communities, they have better
knowledge about local conditions. This feature is central to local government functions
under contract extension arrangements. Local governments play several roles ranging
from administration to monitoring and supervision to co-financing extension to
mobilization and sensitization of the farmers. The POs (for example, farmers groups) are
the clients whose roles have become even more complex than before ranging from
demand for specific advisory and information services tailored to local conditions to
producers of information to co-financiers of extension to monitors to planners, to mention
a few of the roles of the POs. The major benefit from decentralizing agricultural
extension is the empowerment of producers to express their demands for technological
innovation (World Bank., 2000b). However, as emphasized by the World Bank (2001)
Agricultural Knowledge and Information Systems (AKIS) review, mere decentralization
of extension to local governments does not guarantee that beneficiaries will have more
control over the decision making process.
Contracting out of extension services is expected to increase institutional
efficiency in providing agricultural advisory services. The expected economic gains such
as raising the proportion of the poor out of poverty through increased incomes rests on
adapting extension to specific regional or local conditions and on the political appeal of
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increased participation in local governance (de Janvry, Sadoulet, & Murgai, 2002; Oates,
1999; Shah, 2004).
Amidst this shift, however, decentralized and contract extension systems face
challenges that may impede the expected gains (Ahmad, Devarajan, Khemani, & Shah,
2005; Bahiigwa, Rigby, & Woodhouse, 2005; Chapman & Tripp, 2003; Ellis &
Bahiigwa, 2003; Farrington et al., 2002; Ramirez & Quarry, 2004). Financial resources,
governance and capacity constraints at the sub-national levels of government can affect
the sub-national governments’ roles including mobilization, co-financing, supervision,
and monitoring of extension service delivery. Faced with such challenges, local
governments struggle to define how they will prioritize the use of their resources in
relation to their expanded responsibilities (Farrington et al., 2002). An adequate transfer
of resources must accompany administrative decentralization, so that local governments
have the fiscal resources needed to carry out decentralized functions effectively. Political
decentralization is also necessary, as it leads to better accountability and governance
reforms at the local level. In addition, Farrington et al. ( 2002) point out that a privatized
extension system will only function if farmers are capable of articulating their needs,
enforcing contracts with PSPs and evaluating PSPs services.
There is growing literature on decentralized and contract extension based on
reviews of case-studies (Rivera et al., 2002; World Bank., 2005a). But there is little
survey-based analysis on the impacts of the decentralized approach to service provision.
Recent evidence on evaluating decentralized extension programs include Feder, Murgai,
& Quizon, (2004a, 2004b); Godtland, Sadoulet, de Janvry, Murgai, and Ortiz ( 2004);and
Labarta-Chávarri, (2005). All three studies analyze the impact of the Farmer Field School
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(FFS) approach to agricultural extension; an approach whose implementation is at the
lower levels of government. Farmers are trained in specialized skills such as Integrated
Pest Management (IPM) methods and improved farming methods to raise agricultural
productivity. There are few evaluations available with respect to the “new contract
extension” approaches. The author is aware of the recent evaluation of the NAADS
program (Benin et al., 2005) whose methodology is similar to the one used in this study.
However, our analysis differs in sense that our study accounts for self-selection into the
NAADS program as well as the non-random placement. In addition, we ask what
explains participation into the NAADS program as well as the question of whether
farmers are satisfied with the quality of extension services provided by PSPs.
The next sub-sections are structured as follows. The next section reviews the
evidence on agricultural extension, particularly those approaches that did not embrace
decentralization. We then review country case study evidence on decentralized
agricultural extension. The goal of the review is twofold: first, to underscore the role of
sub-counties in decentralized extension programs and second, to understand the
challenges that previous evaluations of extension impacts have faced. Sub-section 2.4
presents the discussion of how the NAADS program works. The chapter concludes with
the lessons about what needs to be done to implement and/or analyze the impact of a
decentralized extension program.
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Prior to decentralized extension approaches

Antholt's (1998) review on public extension systems around the
developing world reveals that owing to the backlog of technology yet to reach farmers in
the 1970s, the need for better management of extension programs emerged. By the mid1970s many agricultural extension systems had been built with inadequate attention paid
to the skill and support problems faced by the extensionists (Birkhaeuser & Evenson,
1991). Consequently, the effectiveness of the extension agents in assisting the farmers
was limited. In addition, very few studies of agricultural extension impacts on farm
productivity, technology adoption, and farmer knowledge had been done prior to 1970
(Evenson, 2001; Evenson & Mwabu, 2001).
The concept of management of extension was the pillar of the Training and Visit
(T and V) system that was first introduced in 1967 in Turkey (Benor, 1987). Under the T
and V system, extension agents met with selected “contact” farmers or farmer groups and
followed a regular schedule for visits. The extension agents also met with their colleagues
and supervisors at the regional level to discuss problems and their solutions (Antholt,
1998). The system required extension agents to have two primary duties: first, to transfer
agricultural information to farmers and second, to report farmers’ problems to the central
government -based extension offices. Management education was a secondary objective.
Unlike the earlier extension systems of the 1970s, the T and V approach allowed for
better communication between researchers and extensionists.
Using the T and V model, the World Bank increased its support of agricultural
extension systems to about 3 billion U.S. dollars by 1989 (Anderson, Feder, & Ganguly,
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2006; Antholt, 1998). A comprehensive assessment of the T and V system in 107 World
Bank-funded projects over the period 1977 and 1992 showed that farmer participation in
the different stages of the program design was limited; there were deficiencies in relevant
technologies, and inadequate funding (World Bank, 1994). In addition, there were
concerns of over-staffed programs, lack of sustainability, lack of clientele ownership, and
generally lack of a bottom-up approach to extension. As a result, the T and V program
was not results oriented. The evidence of the T and V system impacts in Asia (e.g., from
Punjab in Pakistan to Nepal to Thailand to Indonesia to India,) mostly revealed no impact
on agricultural outcomes (Antholt, 1998).
The evidence from sub-Saharan Africa is almost similar to that in Asia. However,
the results must be interpreted with caution due to the methodological differences and
challenges that the impact evaluators faced. Differences in data, initial conditions and
survey methodologies as well as susceptibility to microeconometric problems (namely,
measurement errors, self-selection, and omitted variable bias) confront the existing
empirical studies so much that one can claim the results to be mixed. An example
illustrating these challenges is that of the studies on the impact of the T and V system in
Kenya. On the one hand, Bindlish & Evenson (1993) and Evenson & Mwabu (2001)
found the returns to extension to be high. On the other hand, Gautam & Anderson (1999)
found no impact of the T and V extension services. Perhaps the discussion by
Birkhaeuser & Evenson (1991) and Evenson (2001) can settle the debate. These authors
discuss the econometric and evaluation challenges and note that despite their prevalence
and the availability of econometric procedures to address them, rarely have they been
addressed in empirical studies. Studies on extension impact at the individual farm level
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using a farm-level measure of extension may suffer from the problem of endogeneity in
extension farmer interactions and the problem of indirect or secondary information flows.
Endogeneity arises in any of the three forms namely, omitted variables, measurement
errors, and self-selection (Wooldridge, 2002).
Treating the extension variable as exogenous may not be correct. It is possible
that some unobserved characteristics of certain farmers drive them into seeking out
information about changing farm conditions or new technologies (Birkhaeuser &
Evenson, 1991). Such farmers may be inclined to attend more demonstration days, read
more literature, and seek out extension contact. Analogously, extension agents may seek
out contacts with better or rich farmers who would be good performers even in the
absence of extension contacts. Failure to take this type of endogeneity into account leads
to upward biases of the extension impact. Similarly, difficulties associated with
measurement error of the extension variable (s) and the failure to control for certain
variables such as farmer managerial or organizational abilities can result in inconsistent
estimates.
The problem of indirect or secondary information flows arises where knowledge
that originates from extension contacts is passed on to other farmers who do not directly
interact with extension personnel (Birkhaeuser & Evenson, 1991). The presence of interfarmer communications tend to cause an understatement of extension effects when the
approach of defining extension impact by the number of direct contact is used. The
problem highlighted above can be effectively solved, or at least reduced in severity, when
the extension variable is specified at a village or area level. This variable is then
exogenous to individual households and internalizes the inter-farmer communications.
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An example of a recent study that tries to address some of the above problems is
that by Owens, Hoddinott, & Kinsey (2003) in their study of extension impacts on farm
productivity using a panel sample of households residing in three resettlement areas of
rural Zimbabwe. They estimate the extension effects on the value of crop production per
hectare, with and without controls for unobservable household level fixed effects.
Differencing rids the specification of the correlation between extension and the
disturbance term. Upon controlling for innate productivity characteristics and farmer’s
ability using household fixed effects estimation, the study finds that access to agricultural
extension services, defined as receiving one or two visits per agricultural year, raises the
value of crop production by about 15 percent.
Having reviewed the problems faced by past extension systems as well as the
challenges that evaluators face, we now review selected evidence on the decentralized
extension approaches.

A review of decentralized extension programs

Because of the complex policy environment within which agricultural extension
operates, a review of country case studies along a single policy dimension is difficult.9
For example, China’s extension reform is not limited to decentralization and contracting,
but also includes demand driven approaches and producer organizations, among others.
In addition, several other reforms are undertaken; making the reform process complex to

9

Policies for extension reform include decentralization, privatization, contracting, commercialized services,
cost sharing/recovery, public-partnerships, role of NGOs, use of information, communication and
technology (ICT), participatory approaches, demand-driven programs, producer organizations, national
strategies, among others (Rivera & Zijp, eds., 2002).
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analyze. A similar situation is depicted in other countries implementing agricultural
extension reforms. Despite this complexity, a review of world-wide experiences with
extension approaches can help researchers better understand the role of local
governments and PSPs in decentralized extension provision.
The decentralization of extension to local governments where the center retains
both the financing and delivery has been undertaken by several Latin American
governments with a view of improving accountability and local political commitment
since extension agents work closer to their clientele (Anderson & Feder, 2003). Rivera
(1996) notes that decentralization of extension was driven by structural reform to
improve institutional responsiveness and accountability, fiscal decentralization and the
need for farmer participatory involvement in decision making and management of
extension.
Early studies on decentralization of agricultural extension have, however
questioned concerns over issues such as accountability, relevance and quality of
extension provided by the service providers (Garfield, Guadagni, & Moreau, 1997;
Malvicini, 1996). Other challenges include the financial sustainability and the linkage of
extension with research (Anderson & Feder, 2003).
Fee-for-service and privatized extension are yet another set of approaches where
small groups of farmers typically contract extension services to address their specific
information needs. The provision of extension may be a public entity or private firm or
consultant but the financing is largely public. Under such arrangements the challenges
include the group knowledge of their information needs and their ability to assess the
quality of the services received. A drawback of this approach is that less commercial
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farmers (i.e., poorer farmers and those farming smaller and less favored areas) may
purchase little or no information at all (Anderson & Feder, 2003).
The farmer field school (FFS) approach is yet another decentralized extension
program. The FFS was originally introduced in Asia and involves educating farmer
participants on a variety of practices such as agro-ecosystems and integrated pest
management (Anderson & Feder, 2003; Farrington, 1995). It entails farmer
experimentation and non-formal training to a group of 20-25 farmers during a single
crop-growing season. Some farmers are equipped with additional skills to become farmer
trainers. This approach is expected to improve accountability and the quality of services
provided to the farmers. However, some evidence from Indonesia and the Philippines
revealed that these approaches may not ensure financial sustainability and the outreach
may be limited due to high costs of training the farmers (Quizon, Feder, & Murgai, 2001;
Rola, Jamias, & Quizon, 2002). Recent evidence by Feder et al.(2004b) reveal similar
challenges.
With reference to decentralized contract extension system, the only available
evidence is based on reviews of case studies. In the mid-1990s in Estonia, a national
agricultural advisory service program and a new advisory subsidy scheme were
established as a response to the problems (e.g., insufficient management) of the old
extension system (Loolaid, 2000). Different contract arrangements serving different
needs were designed.10 The evidence from Estonia’s advisory program include better
10

For example, the subsidized individual agricultural services contracts involve legally registered farmers
and certified advisers as direct partners and the county administration as an indirect partner charged with
the responsibility of management, financing, and accounting of contracts for farmers in their county
jurisdictions. Other contracting arrangements include contracts for providing extension services for farmers
in a group approach; contracts for development projects to provide training, support services and extension
to groups of farmers; and contracts for the design of legislative framework, administration and financing of
delivery of advisory and extension services.
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access to advisory services and information to farmers, practical approach by advisers to
provide information and train farmers, and developed local capacity. However, despite
the achievements, extension is yet to be demand-driven (farmers have lacked economic,
marketing, and legal knowledge). Other challenges include insufficient management
capability at the county level and complex contract procedures. Similar challenges are
faced by Honduras’s Fondo Para Productores de Ladera (FPPL), a publicly
funded/private extension system where a significant administrative effort is required to
protect the contractual integrity (including enforcing contracts and preventing abuses)
with the PSPs.
Prior to 1991, the Livestock Production Extension (LPE) in Mali was
unresponsive to the producer’s demands until contracting out began in three livestock
regions of Sikasso, Kayes and Mopti (Quinet-Fermet & Gauthier, 2000). The government
decentralized, privatized and restructured its agricultural services. Mali’s networks of
private veterinarians and paraveterinarians transformed information on livestock, and
producer participation through producer organizations and regional agricultural chambers
have contributed to improvements in livestock advice, vaccination, and environment
management. A notable scheme is the village extension voucher system where less than
20 U.S. dollars is allocated per village through the farmers. This money is used to
contract private agents. The village extension vouchers have improved the empowerment
of the producers, transferred part of the control to the beneficiaries and allowed for
competition among private agents. In addition, the cost of the program is said to be low to
the government.
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Table 1 summarizes additional evidence on decentralization or privatization of
extension drawn from Rivera & Zijp (2002). The review illustrates that
decentralized/privatized extensions face challenges that may impede the expected gains
such as poverty reduction through increase in house incomes and food security resulting
from increased agricultural productivity. At the same time, compared with the traditional
extension systems, there is hope that improved extension service delivery through
decentralized approaches will result into better agricultural outcomes and thus raise the
incomes of the poor. That said, drawing upon empirical evidence from Uganda’s NAADS
may contribute to our understanding of how to improve the efficiency in financing and
provision of agricultural extension services.
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Table 1. A summary on extent of decentralization/privatization and quality of extension in selected case studies
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Author

Country

Extent of extension

Local governance

Possible reasons for state of quality of

decentralization

and quality of

extension

extension
(Amezah & Hesse, 2002)

Ghana

•

•

In 1997, the Ministry of Food
and Agriculture (MOFA) decided
to decentralize operations to
achieve more responsiveness and
effectiveness in service delivery.
However, the process was more
of deconcentration

•

•

(Seepersad & Vernon, 2004)

Trinidad and
Tobago

•

Extension was decentralized,
but not enough authority was
delegated to the regional and
county offices.

•

(Saviroff & Lindarte, 2002)

Venezuela

•

In 1995, a new agricultural
extension program was
established that placed key
responsibility for implementing
extension programs at the local
municipality and established
producer associations to assist
local authorities manage
extension.
The establishment of municipal
agricultural extension offices

•

•

•

There were claims that the
quality of specialized
services such as
veterinary, plant
regulatory, and
agricultural statistics
services was
compromised.
Mainstreaming cocoa
extension within MOFA
extension system is
claimed to have
contributed to decline in
quality of cocoa
extension.
Farmers seem not to have
been served in a
participatory manner and
the quality of extension
was inadequate.
With decentralized
extension, the quality of
extension services is
much better than when
extension was centralized.
The capacity of service
providers has improved
and there is greater
community /farmer
participation is higher
than before.

•

Incomplete decentralization. This meant that agricultural
extension activities have not yet been incorporated into the
plans and budget of the district assemblies and remain within
MOFA’s authority and responsibility

•

As noted by Carpenter (2000) there has been a history of
controversy regarding the administration of decentralized
extension services.

•

Although the program has posted several achievements, lower
level governments co-financing is still too low and they claim
that it is due to lack of central government support for the
decentralization process.
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enabled a bottom-up program
formulation.

(Hanson, Lainez, Smyle, & Daiz,
2004)

Honduras

•

•

•

A privatized system of
extension with private
companies contracted to work
with the farmers.
Each village develops a
proposal identifying the goals
they want to accomplish in the
upcoming year. Private
companies work with villages
in a participatory manner to
implement the plan.
Villages choose from a broad
range of areas or services.

Source: summarized from (Rivera & Zijp, 2002).

•

•

•

The technology transfer
component is said to have
been a success. Over
8,900 farmers above the
targeted 6,500 farmers
were served.
There was continuity in
projects that started in first
year. Out of 51 first year
projects, 38 had been
completed and continued in
the second year.
Except for agricultural
diversification and contour
retention ditches, private
companies far exceeded
their planned for specific
activities in both year one
and two.

•
•
•
•

The participatory extension approach may have accounted
for a large measure of the success of this project in years one
and two.
But to better serve the farmers, they need to be more involved
in evaluating the private companies.
The need for significant administrative effort to protect the
contractual integrity.
And government needs to provide and supervise training of
the private companies.
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How the NAADS program works

Uganda’s NAADS was created as a semi-autonomous institution by Act of
Parliament in November 2001 and charged with the objective of revamping Uganda’s
agricultural productivity through the provision of decentralized, demand-driven and
privately-provided advisory services to the farmers (Republic of Uganda, 2000c). The
NAADS secretariat oversees all NAADS activities in Uganda. These activities include
but are not limited to financial management, development of farmer institutions, and
monitoring and evaluation.
At its inception, six districts, namely, Arua, Kabale, Kibaale, Mukono, Soroti and
Tororo were selected to pilot the NAADS. By 2005, the NAADS had covered 37 districts
in 344 sub-counties in Uganda (Republic of Uganda, 2005c). The program rolls out to
new districts and sub-counties on a fiscal year basis in line with Uganda’s budget cycle
and accounting framework, the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). It is
expected that NAADS will cover the entire country by 2008 (Republic of Uganda,
2005a).
The specific objectives of the NAADS program include increasing effectiveness,
efficiency and sustainability of the extension delivery services, increasing farmers’ access
to and sustaining knowledge, information and communication, and increasing access to
and sustaining effective and efficient productivity enhancing technologies to farmers. The
NAADS program is built on the principles of farmer empowerment and participation,
decentralization, cost-sharing, a publicly-financed/privately-provided extension system
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and embraces linkages with environment, gender, health, research, education and
extension (Republic of Uganda, 2005c).

The placement decision

The NAADS program is presently a targeted, whereby some districts and subcounties participate and others do not (Figure 1).11 Furthermore, within a participating
district, not all sub-counties participate and similarly, within participating sub-counties,
not all farmers participate. Some farmers choose not to participate even if they are
eligible and some who are ineligible choose to participate. It is decentralized in the sense
that implementation is through local government structures, particularly the sub-counties,
which are the lowest local program administrative units in Uganda’s decentralized system
of governance.

11

Over time non-participating sub-counties and districts join the NAADS program. By 2008, it is planned
that NAADS will be covering the entire country.
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FIGURE 1: DESCRIPTION OF THE NAADS COVERAGE IN UGANDA

Districts in Uganda

1 st level of program placement
NAADS districts

Non-NAADS districts

2 nd level of program placement
NAADS subcounties

Non-NAADS
sub-counties

Farmers self-select in/out of NAADS

NAADS farmers

Non-NAADS farmers

Source: Author

The factors that explain the NAADS program placement include performance
indicators based on the government’s Poverty Action Fund (PAF) and the Local
Government Development Project (LGDP), and NAADS specific criteria.12 The
minimum conditions for qualification and participation by districts and sub-counties in
the NAADS include the availability of a three-year rolling development/investment plan
approved by the district, an annual budget approved by the district including planned

12

One would suspect that political factors might contribute toward selection into the NAADS program. Our
discussions with officials at the NAADS did not reveal existence of political pressures to include particular
districts and or sub-counties in the NAADS program. This is a typical unobservable, whose effects on
placement decisions are unknown to the modeler.
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investments, and a below budget line for sub-county investments and human capacity to
manage the program (Republic of Uganda, 2000c, 2001a).
Other than the decentralization-related criteria, other requirements include
agricultural potential such as the rainfall level and distribution, altitude, soil type and
depth, topography, presence of pests and diseases, and presence of irrigation that
influences the production of agricultural commodities.

Financing of the NAADS program

The NAADS program has a vision for 25 years (Republic of Uganda, 2000c,
2001a). The first phase begun in the fiscal year 2001/2002 and will end in 2007/2008
(Republic of Uganda, 2000c). The cost of the first phase is estimated at about 108 million
U.S. dollars. The main sources of the funds are donors, government of Uganda,
participating local governments and participating farmers. The program is funded from a
common basket to which participating stakeholders channel their contributions. The
donors provide about 80 percent of the NAADS budget followed by the government of
Uganda with a contribution of 8 percent. The local governments and farmers associations
contribute 10 percent and 2 percent respectively.
The financing of extension in the NAADS sub-counties is through three sources.
First, conditional transfers are determined by the NAADS secretariat based on a district
resource allocation formula. The participating districts and sub-counties receive
conditional transfers (specific for NAADS activities) from the central government,
through the financial coordination of the NAADS secretariat and the Ministry of Finance,
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Planning and Economic Development (MFPED). The funds are released on a quarterly
basis to the participating districts’ NAADS accounts. The participating districts transfer
the funds to the participating NAADS sub-counties accounts at the district. Of the
NAADS total budget, about 77 percent is targeted to the sub-counties. Further, 72 percent
of the total NAADS budget is directed towards the advisory and information services
component, 65 percent of which is targeted to the sub-counties.
Second, local-governments (districts and sub-counties) are supposed to co-finance
NAADS (see Chapter One). The local governments raise this portion through local
revenue (local taxes or fees). Finally, NAADS participating farmers are expected to cofinance the program by paying τ shillings per annum.13 Each participating farmers’
group is expected to pay annual farmers’ co-funding contributions toward the NAADS
program.
Annual group contributions range between 2.8 to 16.7 U.S. dollars.14 Payment per
member depends on group membership, typically ranging between 10 to 20 members
(NAADS, 2005b-monitoring database).

The role of sub-counties in NAADS activities

In this section we discuss the role of sub-county authorities under NAADS using
the perspective of a hierarchical model of organizational theory. Figure 2 shows a
13

Assume a fraction r of the sub-county population to be NAADS farmers. Assume N farmers’ groups
within a sub-county with each farmers’ group comprising n farmers such that r = nN . The NAADS
farmers within the sub-county are required to co-finance the NAADS in the amount of τ . However, the
non-NAADS farmers do not. Each farmers’ group contributes
fixed amount f, then

φ = nf

and thus τ = nfN = rf .

φ =τ N.

Each farmer is required to pay a
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simplified representation of the NAADS implementation design within a participating
sub-county.15 We only assume a single principal, supervisory board and single agent for
exposition purposes. This assumption enables us to delineate the roles of the sub-counties
and PSPs from the perspective of a simple Principal-Supervisor-Agent model.

FIGURE 2. SIMPLIFIED REPRESENTATION OF THE NAADS PROGRAM

PRINCIPAL (NAADS secretariat)

District

SUPERVISORY BOARD-sub-county
Sub-county officials

Elected farmers’ representatives

BENEFICIARES-farmers
AGENTSource: Author

14

The conversion we use here is 1 U.S. dollar = 1,800 Uganda Shillings.
A detailed NAADS program design is contained in the 2004/2005 NAADS revised implementation
guidelines. In this exposition we omit the details at the district and national level where a structure similar
to that of the sub-county NAADS ‘supervisory board’ exists. Both levels play important roles in
supervision and in the program placement decisions. Here we concentrate on the details at the sub-county
level, the main level of program implementation closer to the program beneficiaries.

15
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The central government through the NAADS secretariat (principal) delegates the
overall implementation of NAADS activities to the sub-county. The sub-county
authorities in conjunction with farmers’ representatives sub-contract PSPs (agent) who
are expected to deliver according to the contractual obligations to serve the demands of
advisory services for the beneficiaries-the participating farmers. The PSPs may be
individuals or firms (including NGOs). The selection criteria for NGOs is coordinated at
the district (Republic of Uganda, 2000b, 2001a) but the procurement committee at the
sub-county selects the NGOs.
The thick circle denotes the registered NAADS farmers’ groups. The dotted circle
denotes the elected farmers’ representatives from each farmers’ group who form the subcounty farmer’s forum. At the sub-county level, sub-county authorities (here we include
the NAADS sub-coordinator since like the sub-county chief, he/she is paid by the center)
and the elected farmers’ representatives run the NAADS activities, although practically
there are variations on the involvement of sub-county authorities in NAADS activities.
The light arrows denote the flow of directives or funds from the upper tier to the
lower tier for execution of NAADS activities. The dark arrows denote the NAADS
reporting mechanisms. For example, the PSP is supposed to report to the farmers and the
farmers must confirm or sign that they have received the services from the PSP. Along
the vertical structure, the PSP is also supposed to report to the sub-county, who in turn
are supposed to report to the districts and eventually to the NAADS secretariat.
The dark double pointed arrow emphasizes the role of farmers’ groups in aspects
such as empowerment and also the crucial role of sub-counties in not only facilitating
contractual obligations including monitoring and supervision, but in the mobilization
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efforts for the formation of farmers’ groups. Monitoring of the NAADS is a responsibility
of all stakeholders. Ideally the farmers are expected to provide feedback on the quality of
advisory services received. The farmers’ representatives are expected to monitor NAADS
projects and provide feedback to farmers and to the sub-county level. The sub-county
authorities (especially the sub-county chief), NAADS sub-county coordinator and
NAADS farmers’ representatives at the sub-county are charged with the overall
administration, management and coordination functions of NAADS activities.
We return to Figure 2 to discuss possible incentive problems; for now let us
understand the role of the sub-counties in farmers’ institutional development.16 The
essence of the farmers’ groups is to facilitate collective decision making processes based
on a bottom-up participatory approach to the strengthening of farmers’ voices and power
to demand for appropriate extension services. Members of a farmers’ group are expected
to have a common farming interest. Each group has an address and a leadership structure
with elected members. Through participatory approaches farmers’ groups identify the
problems they face, participate in planning, mobilize internal resources, and engage in
enterprise selection based on guided evaluations that incorporate cost-benefit analysis.
Overall it is expected that strengthening farmer organizations will improve their
knowledge and skills on issues such as record keeping, group financial mobilization and
credit access and management as well as marketing to operate agricultural as a business.
The sub-county farmers’ forum (SFF) is made up of farmers’ representatives of
all the farmers’ groups in the sub-county. It provides a mechanism through which farmers
discuss finance budgets and provision arrangements of advisory services including the
election of their representatives, decisions on strategic enterprises and technologies to

43
invest in and choosing from a pool of PSPs. In addition, the SFF is expected to monitor
and evaluate the services of the PSPs. A key feature of the sub-county farmers’ forum
(SFF) is that elected farmers’ representatives are supposed to be benevolent; so is entire
the sub-county local leadership.
The formation of the SFF follows a sequence of events, each in turn. First, a
workshop is organized at the sub-county level to sensitize the sub-county leadership
about the NAADS program. At this time the sub-county leadership gets to know their
responsibilities with respect to the NAADS program. To initiate the process of the SFF
formation, a list of existing farmer groups in the sub-county is complied by the subcounty leadership.17
Next, the sub-county chief and his local leadership invite farmers in the subcounty to attend a meeting at the sub-county headquarters. During this meeting the
farmers’ representatives from the different groups are elected to the interim SFF. Those
invited to attend include at least one to three farmers from each of the existing groups,
one farmer from each parish who is not yet a member of a farmers group; and women,
youth and people with disabilities.
The criteria for the election of the 15 member SFF include: at least one
representative from each parish; one farmer must represent farmers of the same interest;
at least 4 members of the SFF should be women; one youth and one representative of the
economically active people with disabilities. Councilors are not eligible for election to

16

A detailed account of this discussion is contained in the 2004/2005 NAADS implementation guideline.
The Sub-county leadership includes sub-county NAADS coordinator, Community Development Officer
and other extension workers existing in the sub-county (NAADS, 2004/2005b).

17
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the SFF. Both the secretary for production and the sub-county NAADS coordinator are
part of the SFF.
The rules at the polls include: the sub-county chief is the returning officer; prior to
selection, consensus is reached on whether to vote by show of hands, lining behind
candidates, or by secret ballot; group participants elect by the parish they come from and
one representative must be elected to represent a particular parish; from those elected in
the first round, a chairperson is elected based on his profile including his communication,
inter personal and mobilization abilities. Three of the members of the SFF are elected by
the elected SFF to the procurement committee that awards contracts for NAADS advisory
services or goods. Until this point the SFF is interim, because it is composed of members
who are drawn from groups which have not yet been registered. Further, the SFF may
still comprise farmers who do not belong to any farmers’ groups. After one year, the
substantive SFF are elected to serve 3 years, renewable for one more term only.
The community based facilitators (CBFs) and the recently established Parish
Coordinating Committees (PCCs) have been added to assist in sub-county NAADS
activities. Imagine a sub-county having over 100 farmers’ groups in NAADS with each
represented by two elected members at the SFF meetings. This situation demands a lot of
sub-county leadership to manage the proceedings on NAADS implementation. The PCCs
have been created to provide support to the sub-county in this implementation.
Relevant for our modeling of the participation decision is the impact of local
governance factors in explaining who participates in NAADS? Second, how to get
farmers who do not belong to the farmers’ groups at the time of the sensitization to attend
at least the first meeting about NAADS (presumably through the local radio and local
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NGOs)? Third, how far does the local political leadership disseminate the sensitization
information (who gets to know and when)? Fourth, the perceptions of a farmer about the
sub-county leadership and group work might affect his/her decisions to participate in the
NAADS program.

The role of s (PSPs) in NAADS activities

Unlike the traditional public extension programs, service provision under
decentralized contract extension is contracted out to PSPs. Under the NAADS program,
the PSPs are expected to deliver according to the contractual obligations in the
Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) signed at the sub-county. The PSPs may be
firms or individuals. They may also be NGOs. A procurement committee (PC) composed
of farmers’ representatives meets and vets applications of potential PSPs for the selected
enterprises. The enterprises may range from procurement of advisory services on
improved crop growing and animal rearing methods to establishment of Technology
Demonstration Sites (TDS) (e.g., Irish Storage or piggery units) for demonstrating better
methods of farming to physical provision of seeds (e.g., hybrid ground nuts, Irish potato
seed) or supply of hybrid animals (e.g., hybrid cross (e.g., goats, pigs, bulls). The contract
specifies the target group of beneficiaries, duration of contract, specification of items
procured, contract value and mode of payment, and other administrative procedures that
the contracting parties must abide with.

46
Conclusion

The implementation of contract extension in Uganda has created a platform for
empowerment of the farmers. However, the above review and that based on the NAADS
implementation progress reveal the complexities involved in advisory services provision
under decentralized contract extension programs. For example, while some PSPs are
commended for the services they endeavor to provide to the farmers, other PSPs’ services
are below the required standard. In our study sites there are instances in which PSPs do
well on delivering contracted extension services (e.g., the Irish storage in Kyanamira subcounty, Kabale districts, the piggery project in Kasawo sub-county, Mukono district, and,
Kisoko sub-county, Tororo district). At the same time, there are cases where the PSPs
perform poorly on contracted extension services (e.g., the cases of poultry projects in
Kasawo and Kisoko sub-counties). Furthermore, there is variation in the pro-activeness
of farmers’ groups to discipline the PSPs who fail to deliver according to the contractual
obligations. Farmers in Bukinda sub-county, Kabale district, provide an example of
strong farmers’ institutions in protecting contractual integrity: they terminated a contract
with a PSP due to poor quality services.
Despite the efforts by the NAADS secretariat to implement quality assurance,
regulation and technical auditing of services, there are other institutional challenges that
constrain the capacity building efforts of the PSPs. For example, the “de-layering” of
public extension officers to create a competitive market with a pool of competent PSPs
has been delayed by the Ministry of Public Service.18

18

‘De-layering’ is a term used to refer to having public extension officers relinquished of their duties as
public officers; but with an implicit meaning that those retrenched/de-layered are re-trainable to join the
pool of PSPs.
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Another challenge is that it is much easier to crosscheck from sub-county records
whether PSPs have delivered on contractual obligations under NAADS, but is difficult to
know from the records whether the farmers were satisfied with the quality of extension
services. It is even quiet next to impossible that interviewing PSPs will reveal their short
comings. Under such circumstances, evaluating the impact of NAADS requires a survey
of the program beneficiaries to elicit information about access to advisory services on
agricultural outcomes. The next section lays out the methodology we used to accomplish
such a task.
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CHAPTER THREE. METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to discuss the survey methodologies that were applied
between September 2005-April 2006 in Uganda to elicit information on farmers’
participation in the NAADS program, quality evaluations of PSP services and the impact
of access to advisory services among participating farmers. Our methodology involved a
triangulation of qualitative and quantitative methods with a view that the former
complement the latter (Ravallion, 2003). First, we discuss the survey design and
instrument, and then describe the site and sample selection. Sub-section 3.4 describes the
units of analysis and measurement. Sub-section 3.5 briefly discusses the qualitative and
quantitative methods applied including the type of questions we address. Sub-section 3.6
concludes with a discussion of the survey and the estimation challenges.

The survey design and instrument

Our goal is understand the impact of access to NAADS on the value of farm
production per acre. The factors that affect the crop yield include innate unobservable
farmer abilities (managerial and non-managerial), the agro-ecological conditions of the
land (soil quality and weather), the inputs used in production (e.g., labor, capital [social,
physical and human], land, time, fertilizers), location-specific factors, policy (e.g.,
availability of NAADS services in a particular sub-county), and the availability of
infrastructure (markets, roads).
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Other factors include the institutional environment in which farmers operate (e.g.,
land tenure system, insurance, opportunities, and laws), and risk and uncertainty faced by
farmers (e.g., price variations, weather variability, crop diseases and pests) (Reardon &
Glewwe, 2000b).
To address the research question, survey data are combined with administrative
data. The survey is based on a revised LSMS module on agriculture (Reardon & Glewwe,
2000b). This module was complemented with additional questions drawn from the
Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS)’s Socio-Economic Survey (UNHS), and questions
that we designed to address specific issues with respect to the NAADS program (see
Table A1). The novelty of the LSMS is not only the depth with which one can understand
factors affecting a particular outcome of interest (in our case crop yields) but also the
potential flexibility with which one can apply them to address policy relevant questions.19
However, adopting any module from the LSMS calls for greater resources in terms of
time, expertise, organizational capacity and funding. Sub-section 3.6 discusses the
fieldwork challenges.
The sections adopted from the agriculture module of the LSMS include the land
owned, rented-in or rented-out, farm equipment, labor (household member and hired) and
non-labor inputs, crop output, livestock and advisory services. We adopted the crop codes
used in the UBOS’s 1999 UNHS crop survey module (see Table A2). The questions
modified from the UNHS include those on household background characteristics
including health, education, sex, and age controls, housing conditions, assets and access
to and sources of credit.

19

A detailed account of the LSMS is contained in (Grosh & Glewwe, 1995, 2000).
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The questions that we added to reflect our objective included farmer perceptions
of local governance, participation and knowledge of local village voting processes,
political connectivity, social networks, and awareness of the NAADS program.
To capture inter-farmer communications, the social network variables used
included the number of days in a month a farmer interacts with fellow farmers, the
number of days a farmer allocates to learning at the sub-county and the number of days a
farmer allocates to social gathering functions. We define social gathering functions to
include off-farm activities that bring farmers together for any reason. These were
classified as functions such as entertainment, funeral ceremonies, religious functions,
drinking (alcohol), and “nigina.”20
Other questions included relate to the demand for advisory services, methods of
advisory services, access to infrastructure, record keeping, perception on the quality of
services provided by PSPs, farmers’ source of price information for agricultural produce,
willingness to purchase advisory services and co-financing of the NAADS program.
The administrative data include data on performance indicators for local
governments, private service contracts, and agro-climatic data such as weather data. The
qualitative methods applied included focus group discussions (FGDs) within each of the
treatment sub-counties. The FGDs discussed issues of quality of services delivered by the
PSPs, farmer institutional development, information flow between farmer leaders and the
sub-county officials, monitoring of the program, and co-financing of the NAADS
program. The FGDs were complemented with key informant interviews (such as the

20

“Nigina” is a local “Luganda” language term that literally means “walk like the rich.” Nigina
Associations are social capital associations where people join efforts to help one another by giving money
and household assets to group members in a rotation fashion. This form of social capital is increasingly
becoming popular in Uganda; mostly in rural areas but also common in city suburbs.
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farmers’ representatives, sub-county NAADS coordinators, and community development
officers).
The survey was implemented in stages. The first step involved consultations with
the NAADS secretariat and technical personnel on survey implementation at UBOS and
EPRC. It was followed by field pre-testing of the survey instrument and the training of
field enumerators. The pre-test helped in modifying the questionnaire to suite local
environment.21 During the pre-testing stage we found that it takes about 3 hours to fill a
questionnaire. This time is too long to maintain a conversation with a farmer who must
take care of other farm or household activities. Although, we had scheduled appointments
with local authorities and farmers before the survey, our experience revealed that the
process was very demanding of the farmers. The consolation we had was that farmers
were always very eager to be interviewed; although certainly when it comes to
information on household assets, land and livestock, some feel uncomfortable. Always
the assurance was that the data is not for government (especially tax) purposes but for
purely academic purposes. We kept promising and reaffirming confidentiality all the
time.
Given the variations in local languages spoken across our study sites, it was
important that we recruit field assistants who have excellent command of the local
languages, but also fluent in English. The process of recruitment was coordinated in close
collaboration with the district planning officers, who then mobilized potential field
assistants. The preferred candidates were those who have had previous experience with

21

However, actual implementation was faced with a challenge on the disposition (post harvests) section of
the module. Generally, farmers could hardly recall information on how much they consumed, stored or lost
to animals. This section was thus dropped from the questionnaire to reduce on the time it takes to answer
the questionnaire.
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data collection, particularly with UBOS. Although the targeted candidates group was
advanced level graduates, luck brought us university graduates and students. Training
was conducted at the district headquarters. For each of the study sites a post survey was
carried out to fill some of the gaps on questions which arose during the first round.
The data was captured using a database designed using Microsoft Access. The
database was ready at the time of data collection; otherwise it would have been difficult
to keep up with the data processing given the limited time.

The site selection and sample size

During the first year of implementation, six districts were selected for piloting the
NAADS program. The selection was not random, as it took into account factors such as
the rankings of a district in the local government performance indicators and the
agricultural potential. The NAADS pilot districts at inception were Arua, Kabale,
Kibaale, Mukono, Soroti, and Tororo (Map 1).22 Within each of the initial districts, 4 subcounties were selected to pilot the program. By December 2005, the NAADS program
had extended to 37 districts covering a total of 334 sub-counties across Uganda (Republic
of Uganda, 2005c).
The present study is based on a random selection out of the pilot NAADS
districts. The reason for this choice is based on the fact that to understand the impacts of
the NAADS program, one needs to study NAADS processes in those districts that have
had the program much longer than the “newer” districts into the NAADS. The three

22

If selection of these regions was based on them being good performers, then an upward bias might arise
if we neglect the non-random program placement in our modeling (Morduch, 1998).
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districts selected for this study were Kabale, Mukono and Tororo. These districts are
hereafter referred to as NAADS (treatment) districts.
Within each of the treatment districts, one sub-county was selected out of the
original 4 sub-counties. However, it is important to note that since its inception, the
NAADS program has rolled out to other sub-counties within the treatment districts and
that some sub-counties have not joined the NAADS program (Table 2).

Table 2. Number of sub-counties in each of the study districts

Selected Districts
NAADS Districts

Total no. of NAADS
sub-counties (SCs)

Year of entry

2001/2002
2002/2003
2003/2004
2004/2005
2005/2006
Total
Total no. of SCs in district
Total no. of Non-NAADS SCs
closer** to selected NAADS SCs
Total no. of NAADS SCs surveyed
Total no. of non-NAADS SCs
surveyed
Total no. of SCs surveyed in district.

Non-NAADS
District
Mukono Kabale Tororo Kayunga
# joined NAADS
4
5
2
11
2
24
28***
1

4
5
3

3*
2
1
3

12
18
1

9
18
2

1
1

1
1

1
1

1

2

2

2

1

9

Source: Author
* Although four sub-counties started with the program, Nagongera sub-county was scrapped from the program
following mismanagement of the program in that sub-county.
** Ideally we considered those sub-counties that border with the selected NAADS sub-counties. However, for the case
of Kisoko sub-county in Tororo district, the closest (bordering) non-NAADS sub-county was Nagongera, which was
scrapped from the NAADS program. Since this sub-county could not qualify for selection in this study, Paya subcounty was selected as closer to Kisoko sub-county
***figure includes 4 urban municipalities.

The analogy applied in the selection of the treatment districts is the same applied
in the selection of the treatment sub-counties. The selected sub-counties are hereafter
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referred to as NAADS (treatment) sub-counties. These sub-counties were Kyanamira in
Kabale district, Kasawo in Mukono district and Kisoko in Tororo district. Since within
each selected treatment district some sub-counties do not participate in the NAADS
program (see Figure 1), it is important to include a sample of them in the study. We refer
to the selected sub-counties as Non-NAADS (control) sub-counties within the treatment
district. The choice of these sub-counties was based on being in a similar geographical
region with the selected treatment sub-county (The cultural backgrounds of farmers
staying in two neighboring sub-counties [a treatment and a control] are likely to be
similar). The selected non-NAADS sub-counties were Kaharo sub-county in Kabale
district, Ntunda sub-county in Mukono district, and Paya in Tororo sub-county.23
Therefore within each treatment district, one NAADS and one non-NAADS sub-county
was selected.
Because the NAADS program had not yet rolled out to the rest of the country at
the time of our study, we sample one district that had not joined the NAADS program.
This district is referred to as a non-NAADS district or control district. The ideal case
would have been selecting one control district in a geographical region close to each of
the selected treatment district. However, due to budgetary and time limitations, it was not
possible to execute the study in three control districts. Instead one control district of
Kayunga, closer to Mukono district (selected treatment district) was selected. The
Weakness of this decision is that Kayunga may serve as a better control for Mukono and
23

At the time our interviews were conducted, Ntunda sub-county was still a non-NAADS sub-county
within Mukono district. However, the sub-county has recently joined the NAADS program. Furthermore,
the evaluation problem becomes complicated when the so called ‘control’ has other programs going on. An
example is Kaharo sub County, which although not under NAADS, runs a similar program known as Area
based Agricultural Modernization Program (AAMP). The presence of such ‘parallel’ programs causes
evaluation as well as coordination problems. Harmonization of such programs with the NAADS program is
very important.
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not Kabale and Tororo. Within Kayunga district, one sub-county was selected as a nonNAADS sub-county in a Non-NAADS district. The chosen sub-county was Kangulumira
sub-county.

Selection of the farmers

The farmers interviewed throughout the study were not drawn from a single
village but instead spread across four villages, one in each of the four selected parishes
within the sampled sub-counties.
The interviews were conducted at the household level. Every household selected
in this study represents a farmer.24 A household is defined as a NAADS farmer if any
member of the household (usually husband or wife or both) is a registered member to one
or more NAADS farmers’ groups. A household is defined as a non-NAADS farmer if no
member of the household has ever belonged to the NAADS farmers’ groups. The selected
farmers’ residences were located with the help of community development officers,
NAADS sub-county coordinators, and chairpersons of the NAADS farmers’ fora at the
sub-county.
Using the NAADS farmers’ group listings in each treatment sub-county as our
sampling frame, 47 farmers from Kasawo sub-county, 40 farmers from Kisoko subcounty, and 40 farmers from Kyanamira sub-county were randomly drawn (Table 2).
These farmers are referred to as NAADS (treated) farmers.
It is worth pointing out that within each treatment sub-county, some farmers
participate in the NAADS program and others do not (see Figure 1). Every farmer is
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eligible to join the NAADS program, but ideally those with some assets (e.g., land) and
the economically active farmers are likely to participate. Since some farmers self-select
to join the NAADS program and others do not, it is important to sample some farmers
who do not participate in the NAADS program. We refer to these farmers as Non-NAADS
(control) farmers. In total 25 farmers from Kasawo sub-county, 25 farmers from Kisoko
sub-county, and 22 farmers from Kyanamira sub-county were interviewed.
Within each non-NAADS sub-county in a treated district, 20 farmers were
randomly selected from a sub-county population listing. Therefore, a total of 60 farmers
were interviewed. These farmers constitute another control group from non-NAADS subcounties within the treatment district. Lastly from the control district, a random sample of
50 farmers was selected from 4 parishes. These farmers constitute the third control group.

24

We interchangeably use the term household to mean a selected farmer.
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Table 3. Classification of households in study sub-counties
Selected sub-counties from NAADS districts

Selected subcounty from a
non NAADS
district.

NAADS sub-counties
Kasawo
Kisoko Kyanamira
31,149
15,062 19,328

Non-NAADS sub-counties
Ntunda Paya
Kaharo
13,412 30,912 17,974

Kangulumira
43,703

6,683

2,927

3,976

3,025

6,549

3,635

9,453

No. of
NAADS
households*
*

1764

1044

1,268

Total no. of
nonNAADS
households*
**

4919

1,883

2,708

3,025

6,549

3,635

9,453

20

control group
3
50

Total
population*
Total no. of
households*

NAADS
households
sampled
NonNAADS
farmers
sampled

Treatment group (TF)
47
40
40

Control group 1
25

25

Control Group 2
22

20

20

Source: Author
* Obtained from Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2002 Census Report.
** Obtained from NAADS Secretariat based farmers’ group information of fully registered NAADS households.
*** Computed by author as the difference between total number of households and total number of NAADS
households in a NAADS sub-county.

An important point to note is that non-NAADS farmers outside the treatment subcounties include farmers who probably would have participated in the NAADS if the
program had been available to them.
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The units of analysis and measurement

Reardon & Glewwe (2000b) note that in hard-to-survey situations, Uganda a case
in point, farmers grow a variety of crops and rear a variety of animals typically on
smallholder farms. The use of non-standard (local) units of measurement is common and
only few of the daily transactions might involve cash. Farmers might have several small
plots dispersed and sometimes controlled by different managers. Plots differ in terms of
proximity to the farmer’s dwelling, land quality and use, degree of land degradation and
erosion and other characteristics.
Furthermore, there might be few or no literate adults in the household (Reardon &
Glewwe, 2000b). These features are typical of Uganda’s rural farmers. Given this setting,
it is recommended that disaggregated data at a plot rather than the entire farm level and
by season rather than by calendar year be collected to minimize the chances that the data
will suffer from serious measurement error (Reardon & Glewwe, 2000b).25 In addition,
collection of data on a seasonal basis accounts for possibility that some farmers exhibit
variations in access to extension, credit, and crop mix.
The number of agricultural seasons in a particular region and the exact timing of
the survey are other issues that need to be considered (Reardon & Glewwe, 2000b). The
recall period for recording agricultural output and inputs should be the cropping season,
not the preceding 12 months, particularly for countries with two or more seasons per year
(Reardon & Glewwe, 2000b). In Uganda, there are two agricultural seasons, since there
are two rainy seasons per year. The first cropping season runs from April to August and

25

There is an exception with respect to livestock. Questions related to livestock should be asked at the
household level (Reardon & Glewwe, 2000b).
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the second from November to January. The best timing for the interview is after the end
of the cropping season. The survey commenced in September 2005 and ended in April
2006.
The person managing a particular plot is perhaps a better person to interview
(Reardon & Glewwe, 2000b). This is because we are able to elicit the relevant
information from the most knowledgeable person. We interviewed the plot managers
(household heads or spouses or both).
To address the problem of non-standardized units of measurement, we collected
data in its non-standardized form and applied unit conversions used by the UBOS in
household surveys (Table A2). In addition, for specific crops such as water melons,
cabbages, pineapples, and paw paws, we took weights for the smallest, medium and large
sizes in selected markets in each of the study sites (see footnote Table A2). Failure to
account for differences in weights of such crops may result in incorrect measurements of
crop yields.

Qualitative and quantitative methods

The qualitative approaches applied in this study included document reviews,
semi-structured interviews with farmers’, focus group discussions, and direct
observations (Chung, 2000). The purpose of the qualitative evaluations is to complement
the quantitative analysis. It is argued that qualitative approaches can aid in explaining
certain processes that we “may” fail to capture in modeling (Kanbur, 2003). However, by
no means do such methods imply causation (Rao & Woolcook, 2003). The qualitative
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methods were used to answer the following general questions: Are PSPs providing the
services as stipulated in the contracts? How effective are different sub-county level
players in monitoring NAADS activities? How effective are farmer groups in managing
technology demonstration sites? Do the farmers and sub-counties co-finance their
counterpart NAADS funds?
The quantitative analysis contains both the descriptive analysis and the causal
(only the reduced form) analysis. The former is used to answer questions such as what
crops (animals) do NAADS and non-NAADS farmers grow (keep)? Which households
are using technologies under TDS? What agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides
and farm equipment are used by NAADS and non-NAADS farmers? What households
access credit and what are the sources of the credit? How effective are sub-counties
perceived by NAADS and non-NAADS farmers? Are there variations among farmers
(NAADS versus non-NAADS) in the participation of local political elections? Are there
variations in the crop yields across NAADS and non-NAADS farmers?
Although the estimates from the descriptive analysis are approximations, they do
not account for the behavior of agricultural households (Reardon & Glewwe, 2000b). For
this reason we explore the causal analysis to answer the question of impact of access to
advisory services on the value of farm production per acre.

Survey and estimation challenges

In the above sub-section we raised concern over the possibility of response bias.
Households were reluctant to provide data on household assets, land and livestock. In
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addition, missing data points were another problem, despite the training efforts to
minimize the problem. Measurement errors are another possibility. Farmers faced recall
problems in having to remember how much they harvested; although after explanations
using local units of measurement some revealed more information than others.
The estimation problems we confront include both the non-random program
placement and the self-selection in/out of the NAADS programs (see Chapter 1). In
addition to these endogeneity problems, there is the problem of having to deal with
clustered samples (Deaton, 1997; Wooldridge, 2002). Farmers staying in a particular
village are likely to be more similar on a variety of ways. In order to correctly analyze the
data, the correlations need to be taken into account. Failure to do so may result in
underestimation of the standard errors. The problem is that the higher the intra cluster
correlation, the less unique information each additional household member provides.
Lastly, the failure to adjust for the sampling design would yield incorrect variance
estimates (Stata Guide, 2005).
We address the non-random program placement and self-selection by applying the
IV methods. First, we exploit political and geographical variables to explain participation
into the NAADS program. The political variables include the political connectivity of the
farmer to the sub-county leadership, whether or not the farmer is satisfied with subcounty in managing their activities and in mobilizing them to work together. We also ask
about the farmer’s awareness of local political voting processes and whether the farmer
participated in the most recent local elections at the sub-county. The presumption is that
these variables do not affect the agricultural outcome of interest. We test for whether the
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IVs are good instruments.26 In addition, other factors such as the local government
assessment indicators are potential candidates for IVs considered in the placement
decisions. However, we face the problem that some factors that affect the placement
decision are correlated with the outcome of interest. For example, the agro-potential of
the sub-county is a candidate in choosing whether a particular sub-county joins NAADS
or not.
We adjust the variance estimations by computing probability weights using the
procedure and data in Table A3. We also apply the clustered robust standard errors option
in STATA to correct for the intra-cluster correlation. Our problem, however, is that
computation of intra-cluster correlations requires a fair number of clusters, which we do
not have.
Based on the review in Chapter two, and assuming we have controlled for the
potential confounding problems, we would expect access to decentralized advisory
services under NAADS to result in higher crop yields among NAADS farmers than nonNAADS farmers. The next chapter checks the validity of this hypothesis by presenting
the empirical results.

26

Really ‘‘good’’ instruments are not easy to come by (Deaton, 1997; Wooldridge, 2002).
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CHAPTER FOUR. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to present the empirical findings on the impact of
access to advisory services under the NAADS program. The chapter constitutes two main
sub-sections. The first sub-section provides the quantitative analysis and the second
provides the qualitative analysis. The qualitative findings are summarized in the form of
responses to the questions raised in sub-section 3.5. The quantitative section applies the
IV methods to estimate the impact of the NAADS program among participating farmers.
The review of the literature on agricultural extension in developing countries
revealed mixed impacts of the Training and Visit (T and V) extension system on
agricultural outcomes (Birkhaeuser et al, 1991). One of the outstanding challenges in the
literature relates to the measurement and attribution of program impacts in face of
econometric challenges such as self-selection in programs and non-random program
placements. However, more recently, econometric procedures that seek to correct for
such challenges have emerged; these include the application of the IV methods.27 The
next subsection describes and applies the IV method using farm level data collected from
selected districts in Uganda.
The focus of this study is to analyze the program impact of the recent
decentralized agricultural extension program, known as the NAADS, which started in
2001 in selected districts in Uganda. In the previous chapter, we discussed that the
NAADS program focuses on farmer empowerment to demand and hold accountable
service providers of agricultural extension services. In other words, the farmers, as clients
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decide the type of agricultural and marketing knowledge that they need, and are also able
to contract with PSPs selected from a pool on a competitive basis. The selection of the
PSPs is based on guidelines laid out and developed by the central government and local
authorities; with the later heavily involved in coordinating the delivery of agricultural
extension services.
The NAADS program targets the economically-active poor, defined to include
those with limited physical and financial assets (especially land), skills and knowledge.
The very poor and the large-scale farmers are eligible to participate in the program
although they are not the targeted population. However, unlike other targeted programs
for which “strict” eligibility rules are supposed to apply, the NAADS program does not
exclude participation within a participating sub-county.28 Women and youth are
encouraged to participate, although in practice it has not been easy to get youth to
participate in the NAADS program. Our discussions with farmers in the farmers’ groups
pointed to the fact that the youth prefer off-farm enterprises (such as becoming boda
boda cyclists) or migration to towns where they end up doing low-skill jobs.29 Women,
on the other hand, are eager to participate in NAADS; although there are still cultural
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Blundell & Dias (2000) provide an overview of the evaluation methods for non-experimental data.
An example of targeted programs applying eligibility rules are the three credit programs in Bangladesh
discussed in (Morduch, 1998). The eligibility rule, although doubtedly adhered to requires that access to
credit is limited to participants having less than half an acre of land. The absence of a clear eligibility rule
under NAADS has implications for our analysis. For example, one could be poor with no assets such as
land, but he/she rents-in land and then chooses to participate in NAADS. Similarly, a rich person may
choose to participate, although the program seeks out to the economically active poor. There are certain
unobservable characteristics that may compel one to belong to the program. Probably we can think of the
economically active poor as those farmers who are “eager” to improve their welfare by exert higher effort
(which is unobservable to the researcher) and at the same time they own or have access to some assets (e.g.,
land).
29
Boda Bodas are motor cycles used for business to transport people, goods and services. Earlier users of
the boda boda used bicycles. More recently, with the support of micro finance institutions, some old
participants and new entrants in the Boda Bodas business have accessed loans to buy motor cycles. In other
cases the youth work for the owner of a boda boda for a negotiable wage, usually on a daily basis. This
form of transport is popular in all parts of Uganda today.
28
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impediments that hinder women’s participation in NAADS. This was particularly the
case in Kasawo and Kisoko sub-counties. Women are expected to perform farm as well
as household cores and in some cases refused by their husbands to participate in
community participation activities including NAADS.
That said, a key characteristic of NAADS, an example of a recent anti-poverty
program, is that some regions and therefore some households get the program and others
do not.30 The non-random placement of the program casts doubt on the exogeneity of
assignment to NAADS and hence one must appeal to evaluation methods that might help
isolate the variation in program placement that is exogenous. The IV method is adequate
if we can find IVs that do not change outcomes conditional on participation and other
covariates but do influence participation.
The literature shows that analysts of agricultural extension impacts are
increasingly relying on non-random evaluation methods to address these econometric
challenges. For example, Feder et al.(2004a) and Godtland et al.( 2004) study the impacts
of the Farmer Field Schools (FFS) approach. Feder et al. (2004a)) applied difference in
differences (DD) methods to study the impact of FFS graduates on farm yields and
pesticide use in Indonesia. They utilized a panel household survey dataset that covered
both FFS farmers and non-FFS farmers. Their empirical results do not indicate that the
FFS induced significant improvements in yields or reduction in pesticide use by
graduates relative to other farmers. In addition, secondary diffusion effects on those
exposed to graduates are also not significant.
Godtland et al. (2004) applied Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methods to
study the impact of the FFS on farmers’ knowledge among participating potato farmers in
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Peru. This method is invoked so as to ensure that the bias in the impact estimate due to
selection on observables is minimized. Similar to the NAADS program, selection of FFS
villages was not random. An International NGO, CARE-Peru, had been running another
rural development project called Andino. Selection of FFS participating villages was
from the pool of villages participating in Andino. In addition, villages closer to the
district capital were selected for participation. The FFS targeted the middle income
population. All farmers in a selected village were eligible to participate in the program,
but with the requirement that participants had to attend all the training sessions. Preexisting farmers’ groups took advantage of the call and enlisted first into FFS. They find
that farmers who participated in the program have significantly more knowledge about
Integrated Pest Management (IPM) practices than the non-participants. However, the
authors note that if control over land and household assets proxies for wealth, it suggests
that FFS is better taken advantage of by the wealthier, while traditional transfer-oftechnology approaches cater to less endowed farmers. The FFS extension method is thus
better fit for younger farmers and for farmers with greater endowments.
With regard to the NAADS program, few studies have been carried out to analyze
its impacts on the program beneficiaries. These include Scangari study (Republic of
Uganda, 2005c) and a study by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
in collaboration with the NAADS secretariat (hereafter, NAADS/IFPRI) in 2005. Both
studies found that farmers are accessing advisory services much more than they used to
during the old extension system. However, despite the positive effects of NAADS on
adoption of improved production technologies and practices, the NAADS/IFPRI study
did not find significant differences in yield growth between NAADS and non-NAADS
30

(Ravallion, 2006) provides a comprehensive discussion on the evaluation of such anti-poverty programs.
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sub-counties for most crops. In addition, the NAADS/IFPRI study did not find evidence
of strong impacts of NAADS on farmers’ sense of empowerment. However, the Scangari
study did find strong evidence of farmer empowerment.
The Scangari study was purely based on qualitative survey approaches and
document reviews. The NAADS/IFPRI study is perhaps the first attempt in quantifying
the impacts of the NAADS program. Although the NAADS/IFPRI study conducted
comparative statistics between participating and non-participating farmers, it did not
control for the non-random program placement as well as the self-selection of farmers
into the NAADS program.
The objective of this study is to estimate the impact of access to the NAADS
program by applying the IV techniques to take into account the econometric challenges
discussed above. The goal is to account for the potential sources of bias in measuring
program impacts. Three sources of biases can emerge in the NAADS program (see
Godtland et al, 2005 for a similar analogy). NAADS participants are likely to differ from
non-participants in the distribution of their observed characteristics, leading to a bias
from selection on observables. Such a bias is likely to arise because of the criteria used
for selecting NAADS sub-counties. Such criteria included local government assessment
indicators, which are not expected to have an impact on agricultural outcomes. The
second problem is that of potential diffusion of knowledge in NAADS sub-counties. In
the presence of such biases, comparison of NAADS and non-NAADS farmers in the
same sub-county is likely to underestimate the program impact. Third, NAADS
farmers/participants may differ from non-participants in the distribution of unobserved
characteristics such as the farming ability that affects both the decision to participate in
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NAADS and the outcomes of interest such as yields, resulting in a bias due to selection
on unobservables.

The analytical framework

This section lays out the estimation approach based on the IV methods. Let y
denote our measure of agricultural productivity. The dependent variable y can take two
values for each farmer: y1 denotes the value of y when treatment is received (belonging to
the NAADS) and yo denotes the value of y without treatment. The impact evaluation
problem that we face is one of missing data, in the sense that for any given farmer, we
only observe y1 or yo but not both at any given point in time (Wooldridge, 2002). Let tof
denote a dummy variable indicating treatment. If tof =1, then y = y1 and if tof = 0, then y
= y0. The objective is to estimate the benefit of belonging to the NAADS that is to
estimate: y1- y0, the variation in gains from the NAADS.
The testable hypothesis is that farmers participating in NAADS get access to
better advisory services provided by the PSPs and thus are likely to access and adopt
better agricultural knowledge and skills, which in turn will lead to better agricultural
outcomes. The agricultural outcome of interest is the value of farm production per acre
defined as the total of the value of crop production and value of livestock adjusted by the
total farm land used for farming. Price data to compute the values of crop production was
collected from three neighboring markets in each of the study sites. The instrument used
to collect this data is attached in Table A1. The details of how the prices were computed
are provided in Table A4).
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Data on output were collected using the farmers’ questionnaire. In the survey we
asked the farmer to identify which crops had been grown and harvested in each of the two
agricultural seasons outlined in Chapter 3. Using the conversion factors in Table A2, crop
yield was computed as the product of the amount harvested and the corresponding
conversions of the non-standard units in kilograms. The derived output was multiplied by
the price per kilogram to derive the value of crop production for each crop harvested by
the farmer. By aggregating over the value of crop production on each plot by season, we
derived the value of total crop production. The survey also asked questions on the
number of animals reared and the farmer’s own valuation of the value of each animal if a
price to purchase that animal was offered. The data from these questions is used to
compute the value of animals, which is a capital stock. We assume 10 percent of this
capital stock as the value of the income flow from rearing the animals. The sum of the
value of crop production and value of the income flow are adjusted by the total farm land
used for farming to derive the value of farm production per acre.
Using the value of the farm production per acre as the dependent variable in
analyzing the NAADS impact is better than focusing on either the value of crop
agricultural production alone or the value of animals reared. The NAADS program is
promoting both crop farming and animal rearing but with focus on value addition
through, among others, the procurement of high breed seed and animal varieties and to
some extent “off-farm” enterprises (e.g., fish farming). The value of the farm production
per acre measure takes into account the notion that households diversify their farm
activities to reduce their risk exposure. This study does not, however, analyze the impact
of NAADS on other agricultural outcomes that the NAADS program is expected to
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affect. These include the impact on non-farm enterprises such as fish farming and bee
keeping. Such activities are still on a small scale in rural areas of Uganda.
We apply the IV method to account for the non-random NAADS program
placement and self-selection in/out of NAADS. The presumption is that the IVs affect
participation but not the outcome equation. The IVs used in identifying the outcome
equation are the local government assessment indicators that were in part used in
deciding whether a particular sub-county or district participates in the NAADS program
or not.31
Since 2000, the Ministry of Local Government has institutionalized the annual
assessment of minimum conditions and performance measures for all local governments
irrespective of the donors supporting them. Before then, the assessment was conducted
under the first district development performance in 31 districts and 13 municipalities.
The 2001 assessment comprised measures to verify local government compliance
to the provisions of the laws and regulations to assist local governments to identify
functional capacity gaps which if addressed would lead to increased outputs and
ultimately improved service delivery and poverty reduction and to reward good
performance and sanction poor local government performance as a strategy for
institutional strengthening. The parameters used include the quality of development plan
(qdp), monitoring and evaluation (ME) mentoring, communication and accountability
(CA); and local revenue performance (LRP). Overall, the assessments of local
governments are aimed at deepening the decentralization policy in general.

31

The assessment of local governments is conducted each year and seeks to establish the degree of local
governments’ conformity to stipulated laws and regulations as provided for in the Local Government Act
1997, Local Government Financial and Accounting Regulations 1998 and the Local Governments Tender
Board Rules and Regulations.
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For each of the parameters considered, a local government is assessed on
performance as follows: (i) the local government scoring at least 7 of 10 points in the
assessment qualifies for that parameter; (ii) local government scoring 5 or 6 points out of
10 are considered “static” for that parameter; (iii) local governments scoring less than 5
out of 10 are considered for a penalty for that parameter. A local government forfeits its
status for a bonus or static under performance measures if it did not meet the minimum
conditions.
Table 4 below presents the scores on selected parameters for each of the subcounties included in our sample. The performance measures are based on the 2003 local
government assessment report. The report contains assessment for the year 2002. The
assessments reflect factors that the authorities might have taken into account in rolling
out the NAADS program implementation in 2002.

Table 4. Local government assessment indicator scores of sampled sub-counties
Mukono
NAADS

Kabale
Non-

NAADS

NAADS

Tororo
Non-

NAADS

NAADS

Kayunga
Non-

Non-NAADS

NAADS

district

Performance measure

Kasawo

Ntunda

Kyanamira

Kaharo

Kisoko

Paya

Kangulumira

Quality of development plan

7

10

10

8

8

6

8

Monitoring and Evaluation

8

10

9

9

7

7

9

9

10

8

7

3

4

5

7

5

8

8

4

2

5

mentoring
Communication and
Accountability
Local Revenue Performance

Source: Ministry of Local Government, 2003.
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The empirical specification

We assume that the value of the farm production per acre by a farmer is
influenced by factors such as the vector of shares of area planted to different types of
crops, land management practices, household’s endowment of physical capital, human
capital and social capital, hired labor, agro-ecological conditions, and access to markets
and infrastructure.
Certain crops flourish in specific agroecological conditions. We would expect that
the value of crop production and thus, the value of the farm production per acre would be
positively affected by better agroecological conditions. As noted by Nkonya et al.(2004)
and Pender & Gebremedhin (2006) perennial crops such as coffee and bananas generally
grow better in bimodal, higher rainfall areas, such as the high potential bimodal zones,
than in the drier, unimodal zones. Perennial crops are likely to be found in the more
humid bimodal rainfall zones. In areas of generally higher agricultural potential, such as
in highland areas having favorable rainfall and fertile volcanic soils, we would expect the
higher value commodities such as horticulture crops (including fruits, vegetables).
Lower-value commodities, such as cereals, are more likely to be grown in areas of lower
potential, along with complementary livestock production (McIntire, Bourzat, & Pingali,
1992).
Given the substantial transaction costs of storing, transporting, and marketing
commodities, access to markets and roads is critical for determining the comparative
advantage of a location, given its agricultural potential (Pender & Gebremedhin, 2006).
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Better access to markets and roads is expected to increase the use of purchased inputs and
the capital intensity of agriculture by increasing the profitability and availability of such
inputs and increasing access to credit (Binswanger & McIntire, 1987). However, as
pointed out by Pender & Gebremedhin (2006), the impacts of markets and roads access
are ambiguous. To the extent that better access promotes production of higher-value
crops, increases the local prices of crops, and promotes more intensive use of inputs, it
tends to increase the value of crop production and thus the value of the farm. However,
better access may also reduce the labor intensity of crop production and thus could reduce
the value of the output.
Access to credit programs may enable farmers to purchase inputs or acquire
physical capital, thus contributing to technology adoption and increased capital and input
intensity in agriculture (Feder, Just, & Zilberman, 1985). This may promote increased
production and marketing of high-value crops or intensification of livestock production
and permit reduction of subsistence production. If credit availability helps relax credit
constraints, this can reduce the extent to which households discount the future. Credit
may also facilitate labor hiring and thus promote labor intensification. However, credit
availability may enable households to invest in nonfarm activities, and thus may
contribute to less intensive management of land and other agricultural resources. The net
impact of credit on crop production is thus ambiguous.
Education is likely to increase households’ opportunities for salaried employment
off farm, and may increase their ability to start up various nonfarm activities (Barrett,
Reardon, & Webb, 2001; Deininger & Okidi, 2001). Education may increase access to
credit, as well as cash income, thus helping to finance purchases of physical capital and
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purchased inputs. This may help to promote high-value crop and intensive livestock
production, as well as promoting greater use of such capital and inputs in producing
traditional food crops. Education may also facilitate changes to income strategies and
technologies, by increasing access to information about alternative market opportunities
and technologies (Feder et al., 1985). However, more educated households may be less
likely to invest in inputs or labor intensive land investments and management practices,
because the opportunity costs of their labor and capital may be increased by education.
As a result, the net impact of education on crop production is ambiguous.
If factor markets (markets for land, labor, and capital) do not function efficiently,
then there may be significant differences among households in their land management
practices and agricultural productivity (de Janvry, Fafchamps, & Sadoulet, 1991). In the
context of imperfect labor and land markets, agricultural households with less land or a
larger family labor endowment per unit of land can be expected to use land more
intensively in agricultural production. The impact of smaller farm size or large family
size on the value of crop production per hectare is likely to be positive if labor and land
markets are imperfect, or zero, if these markets function well.
Similar to the methodology by Pender & Gebremedhin (2006), we model the
value of farm production per acre to depend on the choice of crops and the farm-level
prices of these crops, the inputs and land management practices used in producing them
and the natural conditions of the plot. Because the choice of crops planted varies among
households and regions in Uganda, we do not explicitly include crop prices as
determinants of the value of crop production, instead, we assume that farm-level prices
are determined by village-level factors determining local supply including agro-
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ecological factors, demand, and transportation costs of commodities and household-level
factors affecting transaction costs an marketing abilities.
However, instead of running a structural equation, we run estimates of a semireduced form of the value of the farm production per acre. The causal factors considered
include agroecological zones, access to markets and roads, farm size, access to credit, a
dummy variable capturing participation in NAADS, physical assets, such as equipment
and livestock. Farm size is measured as the logarithm of acres of total farm land owned
under cultivation. Household and social attributes include family size, education, age,
health status, and sex of the farmer.
The model specification is given by (1):
y i = α 0 + α 1 IPi + α 2′ X i + α 3′ Z i + μ i

[1]

where Yi is the value of farm production per acre, IPi denotes participation in
NAADS, Xi denotes household characteristics, and Zi denotes geographical
characteristics such as the agricultural potential of the area as measured by agro climatic
conditions, α = (α 1 , α 2 , α 3 ) denotes the parameters of interest. Equation (1) models the
outcome, Yi as linearly dependent on IPi, Xi, and Zi. Equation (1) cannot be estimated
using OLS because IP may be correlated with μ . Estimation of equation (1) without
controlling for self-selection, non-random program placement, and spillover effects leads
to biased estimates of the NAADS impact α . Failure to account for the self-selection into
the program leads to biased estimates (Heckman, 1979).
X and Z are assumed to be orthogonal to μ i . However, IPi is correlated with μ i .
Equation 1 has limitations. Linearity in IP entails that the program has the same marginal
impacts for everyone. However, consistent estimation allowing for idiosyncratic impacts
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on outcomes at given X and Z is not possible unless the idiosyncratic factors do not
influence program placement (Baker, 2000).
Recall from Chapter 3 that some farmers in control sub-counties in a treatment
sub-county would have participated if their sub-county had not been excluded. This
feature of “partial decentralization” is the subject of (Ravallion, 2006), who observes that
the possibility to find suitable control variables for geographical placement may help
solve the problem of non-random program placement since the problem can then be cast
as that of selection on observables. Controlling for sub-county fixed effects and taking
into account program placement rules, we can estimate the impacts of NAADS on the
participants. In essence selection of a particular sub-county to participate is choosing
individuals in that sub-county to participate in the program (although, as we noted the
previous section not all farmers choose to participate). Therefore, the allocation of
NAADS to a particular individual depends on whether or not the program has been
placed in his/her area of residence, denoted by the geographical placement, GP. The
model for individual placement is denoted by
IPi = β 0 + β1GPi + α 2′ X i + ν i

(2)

where v is an error term capturing the unobserved influences on individual placement and

β = ( β 0 , β1 , α 2 ) denotes parameters of interest. The endogeneity of program placement
implies that the error term in equation (1) is correlated with the error term in equation (2).
Assuming that GPi is not correlated with μ i , We can obtain consistent estimates of
program effects with a single cross-section survey (Baker, 2000; Ravallion, 2006).
However, biased estimates can result if there is omitted geographic heterogeneity which
jointly is correlated with program placement and the value of farm production per acre.
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Descriptive statistics

The next sub-section presents the descriptive statistics to answer some of the
questions raised in sub-section 3.5. We perform simple statistical tests on whether there is
a difference between the means of selected variables across NAADS and non-NAADS
farmers. Under the null hypothesis that there is equality in means between NAADS and
non-NAADS farmers, we reject the null if the p-value is less than the level of
significance (at 1 percent, 5 percent or 10 percent). However, caution must be taken in
generalizing these results, since they are based on simple comparisons between NAADS
and non-NAADS farmers and thus, do not take into account the non-random program
placements and self-selection problems.
Table 4 compares the average characteristics of NAADS farmers with the
different control groups. Panel A compares selected variables between NAADS and nonNAADS farmers in a NAADS district and a non-NAADS district. Since Kayunga district
was chosen as a control district in our sample, it is useful to compare non-NAADS
farmers in Kayunga district to NAADS farmers in the neighboring NAADS district of
Mukono. The NAADS farmers are those interviewed in Kasawo sub-county, a NAADS
sub-county in Mukono district. The non-NAADS farmers sampled from Kayunga district
are from Kangulumira sub-county, a neighboring sub-county to Kasawo.
At the 10 percent statistical significance, the equality of means is rejected for the
education level of the household head, vanilla and cattle dummies, value of livestock and
proximity to sub-county. For all these variables, the NAADS averages exceed those of
non-NAADS farmers. NAADS farmers have more years of schooling. Relative to non-
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NAADS farmers, more NAADS farmers grow vanilla. More NAADS farmers rear cattle
than non-NAADS farmers. In addition, NAADS farmers are more likely to stay closer to
where a technology demonstration site is located than the non-NAADS farmers.
At the 5 percent statistical significance, the equality of means is rejected for the
value of farm equipment, amount of land owned and rented, and the number of farmers
rearing poultry, goats or sheep. The null is also rejected for whether a farmer kept farm
records or not and whether a farmer stays near a feeder road or not. For all these
variables, the averages for NAADS farmers exceed those of non-NAADS farmers. For
the rest of the variables, the null cannot be rejected.
Panel B compares NAADS farmers with all non-NAADS farmers in non-NAADS
sub-counties within NAADS districts in the sample. This case excludes non-NAADS
farmers within NAADS sub-counties and farmers in non-NAADS districts. At the 10
percent statistical significance, the null is rejected for the value of household assets, the
dummy for growing root tubers, and whether a farmer has used manure or not. For these
variables, the NAADS averages exceed the non-NAADS averages. At the 5 percent
statistical significance, the null is rejected for education of the household head,
dependency ratio, value of farm equipment, value of livestock, days spent learning at the
sub-county, says spent attending at the farm, whether a farmer is aware of any local
village political elections after 2001, closeness to a periodic market, and if a farmer
participated in the most recent local political elections. For these variables the average
characteristics of NAADS farmers exceed those of the non-NAADS farmers except for
dependency ratio, number of days spent on the farm, and proximity to the market. Non-
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NAADS farmers on average have many children less than 14 years old, spend on average
24 days on the farm, and are more likely to be closer to the nearby markets.
Panel C compares NAADS farmers with all non-NAADS farmers in the sample.
At the 10 percent statistical significance, the null is rejected for whether the farmer keeps
records or not, whether the farmer is satisfied with the management by the sub-county
authorities, and whether a farmer participated in the most recent local political elections.
At the 5 percent statistical significance, the null is rejected for the education of the
household head, dependency ratio, the number of days spent on social gatherings and
attending to the farm, whether a farmer was aware of any local village political elections
after 2001, and whether a farmer is satisfied with the mobilization efforts of the subcounty authorities. At the 1 percent statistical significance, the null is rejected for the
dummy for root tubers, whether a farmer used manure or not and the days spent learning
at the sub-county. NAADS farmers spend an average of 2 days a month in learning at the
sub-county. Overall, the null is not rejected for most of the variables in Table 5.
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for selected variables, NAADS and non-NAADS farmers in the study sites
Panel A

Variable

Description
Number of observations

Sex

Sex of household head (1=male)

Age
Educ
Hhsize
Depratio

cyval

Age of household head
Education level of head in years
Household (hh) size
Dependency ratio = number of young hh members
(less than 14 years old) to hhsize
Value of household assets+
Value of farm equipment+
Amount of land owned (in acres)
Amount of land rented (in acres)
Access to credit= 1 if access any form of credit; 0
otherwise
Value of crop yield (in kilograms per acre)+

Fru_veg
Coffee
Matooke
Vanilla
Grain
Rice
Legume
Gnuts
Tuber
Irish
Vlstock
Poultry
Goat/sheep
Cattle
Pigs

Fruit and vegetables
Coffee
Matooke
Vanilla
Grains
Rice
Legumes
Groundnuts
Tuber
Irish
Value of livestock
Poultry
Goat/Sheep
Cattle
Pigs

Vhhassets
Fequip
Totareao
Totarear
B117

Panel B

NAADs

NonNAADs

45

47

0.767
47.04

0.766
45.53

8.953
6.56

Panel C

NAADs

NonNAADs

NAADs

NonNAADs

129

60

129

176

0.983
0.517

0.782
49.53

0.759
44.1

0.735
0.121

0.782
49.53

0.798
44.869

0.739
0.06**

6.48
5.71

0.054*
0.274

8.51
6.73

6.044
5.43

0.049**
0.114

8.507
6.73

6.916
5.98

0.109
0.175

0.391
1747
32.1
4.92

0.41
1549
22.6
4.002

0.663
0.478
0.046**
0.044**

0.376
1952
33.3
4.363

0.419
1413
19.7
3.998

0.011**
0.074*
0.025**
0.146

0.376
1952
33.3
4.363

0.42
1942.9
26.1
4.201

0.042**
0.987
0.136
0.702

2.19

1.22

0.029**

1.567

1.258

0.567

1.56

1.53

0.947

0.219

0.341

0.558

0.568

0.228

0.22

0.568

0.307

0.199

169.9
0.233
0.465
0.5116
0.326
0.627
0.093
0.767
0.1627
0.837

186.1
0.228
0.239
0.375
0.094
0.792
0.033
0.717
0.188
0.726

0.697
0.899
0.255
0.493
0.059*
0.242
0.297
0.611
0.767
0.113

517.6
0.833
0.785
0.619
0.643

271.4
0.626
0.656
0.512
0.302

0.095*
0.021**
0.048**
0.07*
0

155.8
0.277
0.196
0.265
0.129
0.810
0.068
0.806
0.124
0.818
0.328
511.3
0.597
0.744
0.552
0.435

196.1
0.208
0.295
0.444
0.118
0.756
0.282
0.688
0.211
0.705
0.044
214.3
0.657
0.647
0.514
0.305

0.27
0.414
0.353
0.124
0.908
0.411
0.531
0.185
0.287
0.058*
0.287
0.024**
0.787
0.273
0.662
0.223

155.8
0.278
0.196
0.265
0.129
0.81
0.068
0.806
0.124
0.818
0.328
511.3
0.598
0.743
0.552
0.436

200.3
0.271
0.219
0.3718
0.1087
0.835
0.052
0.686
0.235
0.716
0.1294
330.4
0.6751
0.6478
0.5138
0.3051

0.165
0.934
0.815
0.252
0.826
0.712
0.787
0.141
0.315
0.003***
0.354
0.131
0.787
0.273
0.662
0.223

p-value

p-value

p-value
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Bee keeper
Usedfert
Usedman
Kprecord
B120l
B120i
B120s
B120a
Local
Nearroad
Nearsc
nearTDS
nearpmkt
Sat_man

Sat_mob
B115
B119

Bee keeper
Whether used fertilizer
Whether used manure
Whether keep farm records
Learning at sub-county
Interacting with fellow farmers
Social gatherings (e.g., attending weddings)
Attending to farm
=1 if farmer was aware of any local village
political elections after 2001; 0 otherwise
Near road
Near sub-county
Near Technology Demonstration Site
Near periodic Markets
=1 if farmer was very satisfied or satisfied with
management of activities at sub-county; 0
otherwise
=1 if farmer was very satisfied or satisfied with
mobilization efforts by the sub-county; 0 otherwise
=1 if a farmer participated in the most recent local
political elections; 0 otherwise
=1 if a farmer has close and good relations with
lower levels leaders at village or SC; 0 else

0
0.0697
0.534
0.452
1.814
2.883
2.906
23.63

0.006
0.107
0.412
0.207
0.807
4.374
5.14
23.43

0.19
0.151
0.247
0.014**
0.210
0.186
0.048**
0.909

0.015
0.125
0.623
0.343
1.97
3.07
3.66
21.76

0.002
0.094
0.344
0.192
0.485
4.67
5.4
24.2

0.188
0.665
0.059*
0.25
0.021**
0.157
0.109
0.024**

0.015
0.125
0.623
0.343
1.978
3.07
3.656
21.76

0.0024
0.088
0.342
0.159
0.642
4.18
5.094
23.61

0.188
0.487
0.008***
0.083*
0.000***
0.1652
0.055**
0.012**

0.953
0.711
0.595
0.833
0.609

0.906
0.947
0.774
0.776
0.789

0.26
0.041**
0.062*
0.64
0.305

0.976
0.808
0.744
0.713
0.591

0.885
0.965
0.757
0.805
0.842

0.01**
0.256
0.885
0.378
0.056**

0.976
0.744
0.713
0.591

0.918
0.8778
0.7686
0.5745
0.738

0.029**
0.554
0.747
0.386
0.142

0.93

0.860

0.145

0.919

0.846

0.151

0.919

0.835

0.073*

0.976

0.875

0.1

0.947

0.862

0.197

0.947

0.8509

0.021**

0.837

0.719

0.379

0.887

0.668

0.05**

0.887

0.748

0.073*

0.883

0.878

0.83

0.87

0.882

0.426

0.871

0.887

0.408

vfm
Value of the Farm+
230.1
221.8
0.825
193.0
235.3
0.187
193.0
222.7
0.421
1
The dummies were created by classifying specific crops out of the 40 crops listed in the questionnaire in Table A1. frui_veg dummy =1 if crops are
fruits (lemons, oranges, passion fruits, pineapples, mangoes, paw paws, water melon) and vegetables (onions, cabbages, tomatoes, spinach, carrots,
others) and zero otherwise. Matooke dummy =1 if type of bananas is sweet, food-type or beer-type and zero otherwise. Grain dummy =1 if crop is
maize, finger millet, sorghum and zero otherwise. Legumes dummy =1 if crop is beans, field peas, cow peas, soya beans, and sim sim and zero
otherwise; Gnuts =1 if crop is ground nuts; zero otherwise. Tuber =1 if crop is cassava, sweet potato; zero otherwise. Irish =1 if crop is irish potato; zero
otherwise. Other cash=1 if crop is tea or tobacco; zero otherwise. Vanilla =1 if crop is vanilla.
+ One U.S. Dollar is equivalent to 1800 Uganda Shillings
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent respectively.
Panel a = Control group is non-NAADS farmers within non-NAADS district; Panel b = Control group is non-NAADS farmers within non-NAADS subcounties in NAADS districts; and Panel c = Control group is non-NAADS farmers in the entire sample.
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Next, we present additional descriptive statistics with respect to the additional
questions that we asked only NAADS farmers. These questions were specifically aimed
at eliciting information from program participants to understand how they perceived
specific aspects of the NAADS program. Caution must be taken to interpret these results
since they are drawn from a selected sample (only NAADS farmers). Table 6 presents the
descriptive statistics for participating (NAADS) farmers. We found that on average 88
percent and 75 percent are satisfied with the services of the PSPs and are willing to
purchase advisory services (if there was a private company providing advisory services at
some fee) respectively. However, these numbers conceal the variations in satisfaction
across different enterprises. For example, participating farmers are generally satisfied
with the services under certain enterprises such as Irish and piggery projects but not
poultry.
On average most farmers belong to more than one farmers’ group, probably
revealing how important different enterprises are to the farmers’ quest for improved
farming or how important farmer institutional development is under NAADS. The
average co-funding (and other expenses such as contributions to run demonstration sites)
varies across farmers. On average a farmer contributes 3.15 U.S. dollars a year in cofunding. However, some farmers do not pay but still belong to the program. Over 94
percent of the farmers have paid their co-funding. This figure is consistent with the
evidence from the document reviews at the NAADS secretariat. Generally, the efforts to
improve the farmers’ organizational abilities through improved record keeping are low
with only 39 percent of the farmers indicating that they keep records on output and inputs
(our random checks with some farmers to produce the records revealed that even those
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who said keep records could not produce them at interview claiming either they were too
far or locked up somewhere in the house).

Table 5: Additional descriptive statistics for participating (NAADS) farmers
Variable
Definition
Obs.
mean Std.
Min
Name
dev
Quality of Extension and Access , Farmer Institutions, Co-financing, and Technology Access
satq_psp
Satisfied with services of PSPs
127
0.882
0.324
0
nfgroup
No. of farmers’ groups a farmer belongs
126
1.667
0.876
1
paidcf
Have you paid co-funding?
125
0.944
0.230
0
Avgfg
Average payments made in co-funding**
126
3.153
4.444
0
Will
Willing to purchase extension
125
0.75
0.433
0
Kprecord
Do you keep output and input records?
125
0.392
0.490
0
nearTDS
Are you near a TDS?
83
0.723
0.450
0
visitTDS
Have you visited a TDS before?
118
0.779
0.416
0
Train6
Received agric. training in last 6 months
126
0.849
0.359
0
Attend
Attended last advisory/farmer group meetings
125
0.912
0.284
0
Source of information on prices of agric. Output (percentage reported)
2nd choice
1st choice
(n= 120)
(n =112)
PSPs
5.83
1.79
Radio
12.50
16.07
Nearby Market
34.17
28.57
Neighbor/Friend
9.17
23.21
Price offered by buyer
8.33
5.36
I negotiate (buyer and farmer)
28.33
24.11
Other
1.67
0.89
How did you learn about NAADS?
1st choice
2nd choice
(n=128)
(n=121)
Extension agent/PSPs
26.56
19.83
Radio/Television
17.19
24.79
Neighbor/Friend
9.38
15.70
Local government Official (SC chief, L.C)
21.09
19.01
Member of Parliament
0.78
NAADS Coordinator/Official
20.31
18.18
Others
3.91
2.48

Max

1
4
1
25
1
1
1
1
1
1
3rd choice
(n=83)
10.84
4.82
18.07
21.69
12.05
31.33
1.20
3rd choice
( n=98)
16.33
15.31
18.37
15.31
31.63
3.06

Rating the relevance of different sources of extension sources (percentage reported)

PSPs (n =123)
Neighbors (n = 119)
Manuals/Flyers (n =100)
Television (n=95)
Radio (n=85)
Cell phone (n =71)

Source: Author’s computation.
** Assumption:1 U.S. dollar = 1,800 Uganda Shillings.

Most
90.24
47.90
17
16.84
56.47
19.72

Least
6.50
39.50
33
12.63
27.06
16.90

Not
1.63
10.92
24
40
12.94
35.21

Don’t know
1.63
1.68
26
30.53
3.53
26.76
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We found that over 90 percent of the participating farmers attended the last
advisory services session or the farmers’ group meetings. About 85 percent revealed to
have received agricultural training in the last 6 months and over 70 percent have at least
visited a technology demonstration site before. Most participating farmers revealed
satisfaction with the way the sub-county manages sub-county activities or mobilizes them
to work together. Participating farmers are also active in local political decision making
processes.
It turns out from our sample that farmers mostly obtain information about prices
of agricultural output from nearby markets (34.2 percent) and the least from PSPs (5.83
percent). Negotiations (between the buyer and the farmers), radio and neighbors are also
a common source of information of price determination. However, PSPs are rated the
most relevant source of extension services among farmers. The radio and the neighbors
are also rated highly as sources of extension services. Also, most farmers reveal that they
first learnt about NAADS from PSPs, local government officials and NAADS
coordinators. Unfortunately, Members of Parliament (MPs) are an unimportant source
about NAADS.

Testing for endogeneity

We begin the analysis by testing for endogeneity using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman
(DWH) test for endogeneity in IV estimation. Applying IV estimation when indeed the
regressors are uncorrelated with the disturbance term results in loss of efficiency
(Wooldridge, 2006). The asymptotic variance of the IV estimator is always larger than
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the asymptotic variance of the OLS estimator (Baum, 2006). The Hausman (1978) test
for endogeneity is formed by choosing OLS as the efficient estimator and the IV as the
inefficient but consistent estimator. In other words, by choosing OLS, only efficiency is
lost by turning to IV (Baum, 2006). As shown in the Table 6 the Wu-Hausman F test
(with p-value = 0.6386) and the DWH chi-square test statistic (with p-value = 0.6225)
failed to reject the null hypothesis of an exogenous type of farmer (NAADS) tof variable.
This result is contrary to the earlier expectation that the type of farmer is endogenously
determined. However, since the Hausman tests does not explicitly state an alterative
hypothesis and therefore need not have high power against particular alternatives
Cameron & Trivedi (2005), it is not surprising that we don’t reject the null. Despite this
result, we present both results of IV and OLS for comparison.
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Table 6. IV Estimation, identification and related tests
Test statistic

Statistic value

p-value

Wu-Hausman F test

0.21981

0.6396

Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-square test

0.2424

0.6225

Sargan NR-squared

1.873

0.3921

Basmann test

1.702

0.4271

Shea-partial R-squared

0.3937

0.000

Anderson Canonical LR statistic

133.09

0.000

Pagan-Hall General test statistic

28.581

0.2818

Pagan-Hall test w/assumed normality

32.716

0.1383

White/Koenker nR2 test statistic

33.835

0.1115

Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Iisberg

39.019

0.0367

Tests for endogeneity

Tests for overidentifying restrictions

Tests for heteroskedasticity

Source: Author’s computation

Keeping the assumption that tof is endogenous implies loss of efficiency.
However, if OLS is biased and inconsistent, then the loss of efficiency due to IV may be
worth (Baum, 2006). For this reason, we proceed to model the IV estimation using as
instruments for tof the quality of development plan (qdp), the level of monitoring and
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evaluation capacity of the local government (ME), the level of accountability (AC) and
the local revenue performance (LRP).

Identification, tests for overidentifying restrictions and testing for Weak
instruments

The parameters in an equation are said to be identified when we have sufficient
valid instruments so that the 2SLS estimator produces unique estimators. The parameters
of exactly identified equations can be estimated by IV. Under the null hypothesis that the
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, we test for overidentification using the
Sargan and Basmann tests (Baum, 2006). The results are presented in Table 6. The pvalues of the Sargan and Basmann tests are 0.3921 and 0.4271 respectively indicating
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are excludable from the
second stage equation. We also performed tests for the relevance of instruments using the
R-squared of the first-stage regression with the included instruments partialled out. This
statistic proposed by Bound, Jaeger, & Baker (1995) can diagnose instrument relevance
only in the presence of one endogenous regressor. We also performed a conditional
likelihood ratio test of Weak instruments proposed by (Moreira & Poi, 2001).32 The
partial R-squared (based on the first stage results) from performing this test was 0.486.
Our IVs are not quite highly correlated with the endogenous variable.
Another measure reported here is Shea’s partial R-squared measure that takes the
intercorrelations among the instruments into account. The rule of thumb is that if an

32

A weak instrument is said to occur in the presence of multiple regressors with only one endogenous when
the partial R-Squared is low or the partial F-Statistic is small (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Stock, Wright,
and Yogo, 2002). This test was conducted using condivreg command in Stata. The post estimation testing
and construction of confidence intervals were conducted using, condtest and condgraph commands in stata.
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estimated equation yields a large value of the standard partial R-squared and a small
value of the Shea measure, we conclude that the instruments lack sufficient relevance to
explain the endogenous regressor (s). In other words, the model is underidentified. Lastly,
we also report the Anderson’s likelihood ratio-test. A failure to reject the null hypothesis
for this test calls the identification status of the equation into question. Lastly, we report
results of the redundancy test. Under the null hypothesis that the specified instruments are
redundant, the statistic is distributed as a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the
number of endogenous regressors times the number of instruments being tested. The
results are presented in Table 6. The tests indicate that the instruments specified in the
value of crop production are relevant.
Lastly, we tested for heteroskedasticity in the IV model. Under the null of
conditional homoscedasticity in the 2SLS, the Breush-Pagan test and Whites tests for
heteroskedasticity are reported in Table 6. The tests based on the ivhetest, all command in
Stata reveals that heteroskedasticity is not a problem in the estimated equation’s
disturbance process. Table 7 presents the IV estimates of the value of the farm production
per acre discussed below. The first stage regression results of tof are reported in the Table
A8.
The results in that Table A8 indicate that education and age of the household head
are positively and statistically significant in the participation equation. Sex is positive and
statistically insignificant in the participation equation. Similarly, household size is
positive and statistically significant in the NAADS participation equation. Access to
credit is positive and statistically significant in the participation equation. However,
although the availability of land is positively related to participation in NAADS, it is not
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statistically significant. Closeness to markets is positive, statistically insignificant in the
participation equation. Closeness to a feeder road is negative, statistically insignificant in
the participation equation. Having farm equipment is positively related to participation in
NAADS, although statistically insignificant. The availability of household assets is
negatively related and statistically insignificant in the participation equation.
Although sub-counties with better communication and accountability mechanisms
and with a better local revenue performance positively influence participation in
NAADS, the presence of a quality development plan at the sub-county is negatively
related to participation in NAADS. The governance factors are each statistically
significant in the participation equation. Household awareness of local voting processes
and whether he/she is satisfied with the management of sub-county authorities are
positive but statistically insignificant in the participation equation. Political connectivity
of a farmer is negative and statistically insignificant.
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Table 7. IV and OLS estimates for the log of the value of farm production per acre

Type of farmer (1= NAADS; 0, otherwise)
Agro climatic dummy (1= southern highlands; zero
elsewhere)
Agro climatic dummy (1 = Eastern region; zero
elsewhere)
Average rainfall for the period 2004-2005.
Dummy for near period market (1 = near market)
Near feeder road (1 = near road; 0 otherwise)
Land in acres (logarithm)
Square of land in acres (logarithm)
Logarithm of farm equipment
Logarithm of household assets
Education of the household head in years of schooling
Logarithm of age of household head
Log of household size
Dependency ratio
Access to credit (1= access to credit; 0 otherwise)
Sex of household head (1 = male;0 = female)
Whether household has had a sick member
Whether household participated in local elections
Political connections of the farmer
Whether farmer is satisfied with management of subcounty authorities management
Constant term
R-Squared
Number of Observations

OLS Estimates
Coefficient Standard
Errors
0.179*
0.099

IV Estimates
Coefficient Standard
Errors
-0.021
0.172

0.677

0.412

0.430

0.451

-0.908***

0.220

-0.754**

0.246

0.042**
-0.101
-0.098
-1.565***
0.091*
0.093*
0.154***
-0.013
-0.152
0.185
0.059
0.080
0.115
-0.006
-0.005
-0.210

0.013
0.096
0.111
0.108
0.037
0.046
0.043
0.012
0.185
0.115
0.238
0.106
0.126
0.093
0.232
0.142

0.033*
-0.089
-0.090
-1.548***
0.086*
0.092*
0.147***
-0.011
-0.102
0.199*
0.063
0.114
0.110
-0.005
0.022
-0.215

0.015
0.097
0.112
0.110
0.037
0.047
0.044
0.012
0.190
0.117
0.240
0.109
0.127
0.094
0.235
0.143

0.069

0.126

0.093

0.128

6.177***
0.724
266

1.563

6.995***
0.719
266

1.678

Source: Author’s computations.

Participation in the NAADS program as captured by the tof variable is expected to
positively impact crop production and animal rearing and as a result on the value of the
farm production. The 2SLS and OLS estimates of the impact of NAADS on the value of
farm production per acre are almost identical. That indicates that the OLS estimates are
not biased by the possible endogeneity of participating in NAADS. The 2SLS is less
efficient (with larger standard errors) than OLS. The results indicate that NAADS has had
a positive and statistically significant impact of approximately 20 percent on the value of
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farm production per acre. The interpretation does not significantly change when we apply
a sub-county fixed effects regression (Table A9).
Better access to markets and roads can have strong positive impacts on the value
of the farm production per acre. Surprisingly, however, the estimates presented in this
study do not support this claim. Access to markets and roads are negatively related to the
value of the farm production per acre, although the coefficients are statistically
insignificant. As noted by Nkonya et al.(2004), farmers in remote areas are likely to be
faced with high agricultural marketing transaction costs that make it unprofitable to
produce surplus for the market.
The availability of farm equipment (e.g., hoes and pangas) influences the
activities on the farm. We find the logarithm of farm equipment to be positive and
statistically significant.
Primary education may be associated with more intensive use of labor. In this
study we find a negative impact of education on the value of farm production per acre;
however, this is statistically insignificant.
Awareness of local political processes is negatively related to the value of the
farm production per acre, but statistically insignificant. However, satisfaction with the
management of sub-county authorities is positively related to the value of the farm
production per acre. Local political connectivity is negatively related to value of the farm
production per acre, but statistically insignificant.
We would expect that having a sick member in the household negatively affects
the value of the farm production since the farmer not only loses time but also financial
resources (taken away from farm activities). We find that having a sick member in the
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household is negatively related to the value of the farm, although statistically
insignificant.
We find positive and statistically insignificant impacts on the value of the farm
production per acre of the dummy variable capturing agro-climatic zone two (southern
highlands), a negative but statistically significant coefficient of the dummy for Eastern
region (includes Tororo district); and a positive and statistically significant coefficient the
availability of rainfall over 2004-2005. The southern highland (where Kabale district is
located) are fertile lands, but are also heavily populated with small farms, possibly
explaining the statistically insignificant dummy.
The coefficient on the logarithm of land is negative and highly statistically
significant. In other words, small firms are more productive than large firms. This result
might be interpreted to mean that, compared with hired labor, family labor is of better
quality, more safely entrusted with valuable animals or machinery and needs less
monitoring or as an optimal response by small farmers to uncertainty (see Deaton, 1997).
The square of the logarithm of land in acres is positive and statistically significant. We
rejected the null that the joint hypothesis of the coefficient on land and land squared are
both equal to zero.
Household size has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. Having
more family members aged less than 14 years is positively associated with value of farm
production, although this coefficient is statistically insignificant. Access to credit is
positively related to the value of farm production per acre; although statistically
insignificant. Age of the household head is negative and statistically insignificant. Sex is
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positive and statistically insignificant coefficient on the value of farm production per
acre. The coefficient on household assets is positive and statistically significant.

Qualitative analysis

This section seeks to provide answers to specific questions such as: Do the PSPs
provide the services as stipulated in the contracts; how effective are the different subcounty level players in monitoring NAADS activities?; and do farmers and sub-counties
co-finance their counterpart NAADS funds? Before providing answers to these questions,
a description of the NAADS enterprises carried out in each of the sub-counties is
provided. Table A5-A7 summarizes the NAADS enterprise profiles for the selected study
sites since inception of the program in 2001. Some observations from Table A5-A7
deserve discussion.
First, there is variation in the selected enterprises across the three study sites in
each of the fiscal years. For example, although banana growing is common in Kasawo
sub-county and in isolated areas in Kisoko sub-county, it is not a major NAADS
enterprise in Kabale. However, Irish potato growing enterprise is a very important
enterprise in Kabale and not in Mukono and Tororo. The variation of projects across the
three study sites reflects the different emphasis that farmers place on different farming
activities. This may be driven by agro climatic conditions, cultural/historical reasons, and
the need to diversify farming activities. For example, coffee and vanilla growing are
common in Kasawo and not in Kisoko and Kyanamira. Historically, areas around Lake
Victoria (of which Mukono district belongs) have been known for Robusta coffee
growing. However, during the 1990s and early 2000, a “new” crop known as vanilla was
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introduced in Uganda. This crop was mainly introduced as a money maker as many
farmers cut down coffee and/or abandoned other food crops in response to the growing
demand for vanilla at high prices. During the late 1990s and early 2000, Indonesia and
Madagascar, the World’s leading producers of vanilla experienced a decline in
production, partly due to weather related causes.
By 2002, a farmer could earn between 15-25 U.S. dollars per kilogram of vanilla.
Unfortunately, at the time of our interview, farmers expressed concern over what some
called “wasted investments, time and energy” because vanilla prices have dropped to less
than 2 U.S. dollars per kilogram (see Table A4). Some farmers have in fact cut down
vanilla plants and resorted back to other food crops they grew before the “vanilla boom”.
Hybrid coffee varieties and improved methods of Vanilla growing and processing are
some of the activities that are being promoted by NAADS through PSPs. Our interviews
with farmers showed that they questioned the relevance of the investments in vanilla
improvements; ironically, it is the farmers who chose these enterprises for investment
support under NAADS. My interpretation of this is that probably at the time farmers
chose vanilla investment, they had little knowledge about the relationships between their
production decisions and the international supply, which in part influence the price they
receive.
Second, goat management projects appear in all the three study sites. Goats are
easier to look after, profitable, multiply faster, and a quick source of money to cushion
negative shocks that rural households are prone to. The NAADS program is promoting
the rearing of high breed goats (e.g., Boer goats) for meat production. In all study sites,
farmers expressed satisfaction with the quality of the goats that are procured at the sub-
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county. One farmer in Kisoko sub-county lamented that: “with goat production, every
farmer in NAADS in Tororo will go out of poverty”.
The contracts for goat procurement stipulate among others the expected goat size,
weight, and breed type of the goats. All study sites have opportunities to expand goat
meat production which is on high demand in both rural and urban markets. However,
farmers pointed to the lack of adequate land to rear goats on a large scale.
Third, fish farming is predominant in Kyanamira as opposed to Kasawo and
Kisoko sub-counties. This is because Kabale (and thus, Kyanamira) is a hilly area with
low valleys that are suitable for fish farming. At the time of this study, very few fish
ponds were operational in Kyanamira. Two of the operational fish ponds we visited are
run by a NAADS youth farmers group in Muyumbu parish. The youth group had
harvested and sold fish on two occasions, albeit in small quantities. Two other fish ponds
located near Kyanamira sub-county were not yet operational, although record checks with
the NAADS sub-county coordinator revealed that a PSP had been contracted to do the
renovation. This enterprise is a promising one but not without limitations and problems.
First, there is the concern of inadequate fish fries supply. At the time of the study, we
were told that fish fries are obtained from a single producer located in Kajjansi, near the
shores of Lake Victoria (near the capital city, Kampala). The second concern is that it
could be a viable project if farmers could access financial assistance to expand the
projects. However, although farmers think that fish farming is a viable enterprise, they
expressed concern over the environmental damage created by the construction of fish
ponds.
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Known for the production of passion fruits, Kabale is also spearheading the
growing of apples in Uganda under the support of the NAADS program. Apple growing
in Kabale was earlier on supported by the International Center for Research in Agro
forestry (ICRAF). At the time of our study, few farmers were growing apples. An
interview with a NAADS farmers’ representative and a female farmer in Kyanamira
revealed that the enterprise is profitable and they wish that it can be expanded to many
farmers. However, farmers believe that the PSPs teaching about apple management are
“not practical” and have varying approaches to teaching the farmers.
The chairperson, farmers’ representative, Kyanamira sub-county said: “Some of
us (farmers) are more knowledgeable than the so called PSPs on apple management, but
are not given a chance under existing rules to become providers”. Thus, some farmers do
believe that they can “even be better PSPs” than those currently teaching them about
apple management. However, at the time of our study, the regulations prevented farmers
from becoming PSPs.
Lastly, Mukono and Kayunga districts specialize in the production of pineapples,
water melons, and papaws. These districts are arguably among the leading suppliers of
pineapples, water melons and papaws to the capital city, Kampala. During our field visits,
we came across trucks that had come from neighboring Kenya to transport fruits from
Mukono and Kayunga to Kenyan markets. The major concern that farmers raised is the
trade off between having to grow pineapples on a large area (farmers claimed that good
pineapples do not need tree shades) and the clearance of trees, thereby exposing land to
soil erosion. The only crops intercropped with pineapples are bananas.
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The purpose of the above enterprise description was to highlight some of the
NAADS activities carried in the study sites that we visited. The strengths and the general
concerns of the selected enterprises are also noted. In the next sub-section, analysis of
specific NAADS program features is conducted. This is accomplished by answering the
questions raised in the previous chapter. Our focus is on the role of PSPs, the local
government authorities and farmers’ institutions.

Are PSPs providing the services as stipulated in the contracts?

A NAADS farmer in Kasawo sub-county, commented: generally, PSPs do their
job: they deliver the services; however, the quality of these services is usually poor,
particularly for poultry in Kasawo sub-county. we interviewed NAADS sub-county
coordinators, community development officers and farmers’ representatives to provide
their own assessments on the above question. The assessment involved file reviews of
past PSP contracts as well as understanding the progress and challenges met in
implementing each of the contracts with the PSPs. Table A5-A7 shows the assessments
of the PSP contracts since the inception of the NAADS program in the study sites.
Generally, in all study sites most PSPs do complete their contractual obligations
to the farmers; however, there are concerns with respect to the quality of the services.
From Table A5-A7, examples of unsatisfactory PSP services include the banana, vanilla,
and local chicken improvement projects in Kasawo sub-county. In Kisoko sub-county
concerns were mainly with the quality of services under the local poultry contracts. In the
previous section we noted that in Kyanamira sub-county farmers expressed concerns
about the variations in training approaches among apple PSPs. This observation was
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found to be consistent with respect to the responses from the focus-group discussions in
Kyanamira.
With respect to the Irish potato growing scheme, farmers are generally satisfied
with the training provided by the PSPs under NAADS; however, they pointed out the
inadequacy of the potato seeds supplied to the farmers. In addition, farmers were
generally dissatisfied with the knowledge they were taught on pest control for Irish
potato. Indeed, pests are a major problem facing Irish potato growers in Kyanamira that
require immediate attention from the concerned authorities (i.e., NAADS, MAAIF). In
addition, farmers in Kyanamira sub-county suggested the need for an extra component of
training in the preparation of potato seeds.
Other challenges affecting the status of enterprises include the untimely
implementation (e.g., toward the end of the agricultural season), and the availability of
few competent service providers. The desk reviews revealed that some sub-counties have
to source PSPs from distant areas. This raises the costs associated with contracting
advisory services. There is also the problem of low skilled staff at the sub-county. This
slows the decision making processes as well as the utilization of resources and the
reporting and accountability for program funds.
Farmers are grateful for the access to knowledge through demonstration sites.
However, the replication of the technologies by the farmers is mixed. In Kyanamira,
although farmers expressed their satisfaction with the knowledge acquired from the
establishment of modern storage facilities, adoption to their own farms as revealed by the
farmers in discussion groups is still limited. The same finding is supported by the
interviews with key informants.
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The procurement committees (PCs) are vigilant in canceling contracts with PSPs
whenever sub-standard work is delivered. They are also vigilant in ensuring that the
reporting mechanisms by the PSPs are adhered to. The PSPs must sign the farmers’ group
visitors’ book whenever training is conducted. The members of the farmers’ fora get a
copy of the planned work schedule (e.g., training) by the PSPs and use it in checking
whether the work has been done or not. Our assessments reveal that the farmers are aware
and practice the reporting mechanism. Farmers sign attendance sheets after confirming
that they have received training or the expected deliverables.33
Sub-counties enforce the payment schedules of the contracts and in some cases
institute extra measures to delay extra payments to the PSP unless the amount of work
done is satisfactory. This was particularly the case in Kyanamira sub-county, Kabale
district. In the neighboring sub-counties of Rubaya and Bukinda, PSPs that had not
delivered on the stipulated work were made to refund the monies and their contracts were
terminated.
However, there are obstacles that the sub-county authorities face. For example,
they mentioned the delay of funds either from the district or the center. Of more concern
is that some disbursements of quarterly releases come late, and this puts pressure on the
local authorities to spend the money before the end of the quarter. As a result, the

33

The exception to this is a story of what happened in Nagongera sub-county, neighboring Kisoko subcounty in Tororo district. Nagongera was one of the “early NAADS sub-counties” but one which was
scrapped off the program due to collusion between local government authorities and the PSPs. Exploring
the ignorance of farmers, a PSP colluding with sub-county authorities reported that he had conducted
training yet it was not true. Fortunately, the NAADS district authorities and the Secretariat intervened;
although the repercussions eventually resulted in suspension of Nagongera from the NAADS program.
Probably scrapping the program was not the best thing to do; since the beneficiaries were also penalizedbut the fact that swift measures were taken depicts the existence of measures within NAADS to
enforce/terminate contracts.
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processes of contracting are done in a rush, which NAADs sub-coordinators admit may
affect value for money. Also, although there is almost 100 percent match between what
the sub-counties budget and the actual releases, limited funds are earmarked for
monitoring NAADS activities. For example, based on the 2004 NAADS funds release
estimates, the budget per sub-county (i.e., sub-counties one year old with NAADS)
earmarked for monitoring and evaluation was 1.98, 2.0 and 1.83 million Uganda shillings
for Mukono, Kabale and Tororo districts, respectively (NAADS MIS, 2004). 34
The farmers’ forum is supposed to monitor the PSPs and in general do routine
supervision of NAADS activities in the sub-county; due to inadequate funds for
monitoring, the forum hardly does so. In fact, the concern raised by all the NAADS
coordinators in all the study sites is that members of the farmers’ forum only monitor if
they know that their allowances for monitoring are available; otherwise they don’t.

How effective are the different sub-county level players in monitoring NAADS activities?

A NAADS coordinator said: Monitoring by farmers’ representatives has been
monetized; without money, they cannot monitor...And local political leaders tend to
intensify monitoring of NAADS programs when local elections are nearby.
On a scale of 1-4 (1 = Weak [don’t monitor], 2 = fair [sometimes monitor], 3 =
active [often monitor], and 4 =very active[regularly monitor]), we asked the NAADS
sub-coordinators to rank and explain the effectiveness of farmers, farmers’

34

Roughly this translates into about 1,000 U.S. dollars per sub-county per year (assuming 1 U.S. dollar =
1,800 Uganda shillings).
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representatives, local political leadership, sub-county chiefs and sub-county NAADS
coordinators in monitoring NAADS activities at the sub-county.
Farmers are not active (but fair) in communicating to the sub-county authorities
about the progress of NAADS activities in their sub-counties. The sub-county NAADS
coordinators claim that this is attributed to the illiteracy levels of the participating
farmers. However, the recent formation of Parish Coordinating Committees (PCCs) is
expected to bridge the information flow gap between the farmers and the sub-county. 35
The farmers’ representatives are active in monitoring NAADS activities in the subcounties. However, we found that farmers’ representatives do monitor only when there
are funds available for them to monitor NAADS activities. Given that the earmarked
funds for monitoring at the sub-county are limited and have to be allocated among
various monitoring agents (e.g., sub-county NAADS coordinators, farmers’
representatives), monitoring of NAADS activities as noted above is in general limited.
This raises a very important question of whether the services provided by the PSPs are
accomplished according to the contractual obligations. It also becomes very difficult to
keep track of what types of PSPs (individuals, NGOs, private firms) are delivering the
right services to the farmers. If we are to expect increased agricultural outcomes (e.g.,
increased crop yields and knowledge) and thus anticipate increased household incomes

35

Parishes are the next lower administrative units after sub-counties; however, unlike sub-counties,
parishes are not the core unit of decentralized service delivery. In fact, the administrative structures of subcounties have been established from the colonial days in the 1960s. In the study sites we surveyed, a typical
sub-county constitutes between 4 to 6 parishes. At the inception of the NAADS program, parishes had no
role to play in agricultural extension service delivery. However, implementation of the NAADS program
became much harder without involving parish level authorities (e.g., chiefs) who are much closer to the
farmers than do the sub-county authorities. Prior to the formation of the PCCs, NAADS farmers hardly got
feedback from their representatives on the deliberations held at the sub-county. This was the case in all the
study sites we visited. However, the PCC lacks the capacity and equipment (e.g., bicycles) to perform their
duties. In addition, there are no incentives in terms of better allowances for them to monitor the NAADS
program.
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and poverty reduction, there must be a clear strategy on monitoring the PSPs to ensure
that the kind of services received are those that the farmers actually demand.
We found that some NGOs are responsive to the needs of the farmers and indeed
farmers expressed satisfaction of their services. An example is World Vision, an
International NGO that is actively involved in NAADS activities in Mukono district. On
the other hand, some private individual providers are not very responsive to farmers’
needs. This is particularly true in Kasawo sub-county poultry projects; however, in
Tororo and Kabale districts, individual service providers are much more proactive and
likely to deliver their services according to the contractual obligations.
The sub-county political leader of government business, known as the LC3
Chairpersons, are said to be active in monitoring NAADS activities. However, in general
the other LC3 council members representing the different parishes with a particular subcounty and groups of people in the sub-county do not. The council members too monitor
only when there are allowances from the sub-county for them to do so. The sub-county
chiefs are ranked fair (meaning they sometimes monitor), with variations. The SNC are
rated active (meaning that thy regularly monitor); but constrained because NAADS
activities have grown and this implies many responsibilities. They reported that the
monitoring resources are limited. Generally, SNC officials revealed that they execute
their assigned duties as per NAADS guidelines, but complained of “being overstretched
into doing other sub-county activities”.
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Farmer group dynamics and technology demonstration site (TDS) management
Since the NAADS program focal point is farmers’ groups, it is important to ask
questions relevant for farmer group formation and sustainability. One of the successes of
NAADS since its inception is the formation of active farmers’ groups. Although, some
groups dropped out at inception (probably because of different expectations of NAADS),
registered farmers groups have increased to over 13,202 in 2005. As we noted in Chapter
2, farmer group member representation takes into gender into account. Farmers groups
hold meetings regularly, mobilize funds, and are eager to learn at the sub-counties. This
was especially true in Kyanamira and Kisoko sub-counties than in Kasawo sub-county. In
the latter, some farmers claimed lack of transparency among some group members when
it comes to seed sharing and the placement of technological demonstration sites.
In general, there are challenges with respect to TDS management. First, in some
groups farmers have neglected the collective responsibility of looking after TDS. The
examples include the piggery projects in Kisoko and Kasawo sub-counties where some
host farmers have solely taken over the care and feeding obligations yet it is supposed to
be a group responsibility. There are also isolated instances in which the some TDS host
farmers have neglected the responsibilities delegated to them by fellow group members.
An example is that of a bull TDS host farmer in Kasawo who abandoned the bull without
feeding and care until the SNC came to its rescue. A working solution is currently being
implemented were the host farmer agrees to pass-on the young ones (e.g., piglets) to each
group member so that responsibility is shared.
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Do the farmers and sub-counties co-finance their counterpart NAADS funds?
A NAADS sub-county coordinator in Kabale; a farmers’ representative in
Kyanamira sub-county, and a female farmer on the procurement committee in Tororo
said: Farmers are eager to co-finance under NAADS. Indeed many of them contribute
with happiness because they own NAADS.
We asked farmers (both in the survey and in the focus group discussions) about
their co-financing obligations of the NAADS program. We found that farmers are active
and most of them have paid up their required co-funding of the NAADS program. This
perhaps reveals how important the participating farmers feel about the co-ownership and
expectations about the NAADS program. On the contrary, sub-county governments
barely meet their annual co-financing contributions towards the NAADS program. Based
on the study sites, Kasawo and Kisoko sub-counties had not paid co-funding requirement
for the fiscal year 2005. The responses for the failure of sub-counties to co-finance lead
to the general answer that they lack revenue sources, especially following the scrapping
of graduated tax and market dues, which were the main tax handles at the sub-county
level. In addition, there have been delays in releasing the compensation funds that the
central government pledged as a replacement for the revenue loss at the sub-counties.
Unfortunately, we find that farmers are beginning to shoulder the burden of the
sub-county in addition to meeting their financial obligations. This is either in the form of
farmers’ groups putting money together to assist the local government or planting a
garden for the sub-county or increasing their co-funding requirements. This was the case
in Kisoko and Kasawo sub-counties. Although this reveals how farmers are getting
attached to contract extension, there is urgent need to address the imbalance since the
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sub-county authorities claim they will meet their co-funding obligations only when
central government sends the promised grants to cushion their inability to collect enough
taxes.

106
CHAPTER FIVE. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Policies to increase agricultural productivity are a subset of the many
interventions that the Government of Uganda is vigorously implementing to eradicate
rural poverty. The NAADS program is among such interventions that started in 2001 with
the aim of improving farmers’ knowledge about farming and marketing outcomes
through adoption of modern technologies and access to advisory services tailored to the
local needs. Moreover, the program is implemented through decentralized structures of
local government, thereby increasing the likelihood that the local needs are matched and
thus, efficient and effective extension service delivery is expected.
Being a relatively new intervention that started in 2001, and one involving huge
financial resources, a fundamental question that echoes through the stakeholders (e.g.,
farmers, NGOs, the implementers and development partners) is whether the program is
having a positive impact on the livelihoods of the poor. This fieldwork-based thesis
contributes to the literature on the impacts of the NAADS program by analyzing survey
data collected from selected farmers in selected districts in Uganda. The data come from
a sample of 305 farmers collected during September 2005-April 2006 from 7 subcounties in 4 districts in rural Uganda.
The methods applied included a mix of both quantitative and qualitative
techniques, all aimed at understanding the impact of access to the NAADS program on
the value of farm production per acre. Qualitative analysis was used to complement the
quantitative analysis. The data were collected using a questionnaire collecting plot-level
data by agricultural seasons. The questionnaire combined sections of the LSMS module
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on agriculture, and household background characteristics and asset sections of the
Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS). Additional questions capturing NAADS
specific issues were appended to the questionnaire. Notwithstanding the fieldwork
challenges, there are important findings, lessons and conclusion that emerged from this
research.
We cannot reject the null that the NAADS program has had an impact. The 2SLS
results show no program impact; however, the OLS results show that the program had a
positive impact on the value of farm production per acre of about 20 percent. Access to
markets and roads are negatively related to the value of the farm production per acre,
although the coefficients are statistically insignificant. The availability of farm equipment
has a positive and statistically significant impact on the value of farm production per
acre. We find a negative but statistically insignificant impact of education on the value of
farm production per acre.
Awareness of local political processes is negatively related to the value of the
farm production per acre, but is statistically insignificant. However, satisfaction with the
management of sub-county authorities is positively related to the value of the farm
production per acre. Local political connectivity is negatively related to value of the farm
production per acre, but is statistically insignificant.
The availability of land is negative and highly statistically significant. In addition,
the square of the logarithm of land in acres is positive and is statistically significant.
Household size has a positive and significant coefficient. In addition, having more
family members aged less than 14 years is positively associated with value of farm
production, although this coefficient is statistically insignificant. Access to credit is
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positively related to the value of farm production per acre; although statistically
insignificant. Age of the household head is negative and statistically insignificant. Sex
has a positive and statistically insignificant coefficient on the value of farm production
per acre. Household assets are positively and statistically significantly related to the value
of the farm production.
What factors might explain a positive impact of NAADS on the value of farm
production per acre among participants?
We find that NAADS farmers participate in the local decision making processes
governing the program. Unlike the previous traditional extension system, which was
based on a top-bottom approach, the NAADS program enables the program beneficiaries
to engage in the enterprise choice of what they want to invest in. Moreover, farmers are
empowered to hold PSPs accountable.
The development of farmer institutions aligned to the farmers’ investment
interests at the village level (thereby incorporating cultural and climatic characteristics)
has changed the perspectives of farmers to view agriculture as a viable enterprise.
Farmers’ groups are a source of voice and inclusion (e.g., of women and youth). Voting
structures are underpinned by clear guidelines. Through the farmers’ fora and the subcounty farmers’ forum, farmers get to learn about the NAADS activities taking place in
the sub-county. These institutions have served as a strong mechanism to reduce the
information asymmetries that impede farmers’ decision making processes.
We find that, although farmers do not have a history of paying for extension, they
are contributing to program financing through co-financing. A majority of NAADS
farmers have paid up their co-funding requirements in the study sites. This may be
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interpreted to mean that the farmers have appreciated the benefits from the program
and/or they are beginning to own the NAADS processes. However, it is still a long way
to go before farmers’ contributions grow to displace the central government transfers.
Agricultural extension, as a public good, will always require a strong involvement of
public support.
The ability for farmers to diversify their enterprise choice is yet another benefit
among NAADS farmers. We found that NAADS farmers are likely to participate in not
only crop farming but also animal rearing. Increasingly, participating farmers grow fruits
and vegetables. These fruits and vegetables are not only a good source of supplementary
income (beyond that from traditional sources of food or cash crops) but also supplement
the nutritional needs of the farmers.
The participation in advisory service provision has increased partnerships
between NGOs, CBOs and the private sector. Engaging NGOs and CBOs that work with
local communities can enhance service provision as shown by Barr, Fafchamps, &
Owens (2005). However, the effectiveness in service delivery of the different private
sector players is partly influenced by their motives, and the human capacities. Established
NGOs with a reputation to protect have built strong human capacity and tend to fulfill
their contractual obligations. At the same time, opening the opportunities to individual
PSPs created employment for potential graduates from higher institutions of learning.
However, our fieldwork reviews revealed that such graduates find it difficult to adjust to
the needs of the farmers.
The NAADS program has invested heavily in technology development sites. Our
interviews revealed that the farmers are utilizing the TDS facilities and are heavily
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involved in their establishment. The hope is that farmers adopt modern farming
techniques demonstrated and thus, agricultural outcomes are likely to improve in the
future.
Despite finding a positive impact of NAADS on the value of farm production per
acre, we discuss the factors outside of the NAADS program and those inherent in the
current system of NAADS that might impede further gains from NAADS program.
There are problems facing local governments in Uganda such as inadequate
financial resources, inadequate capacity to monitor programs, and the reluctance of local
authorities to implement the NAADS program. After the elimination of the local graduate
tax revenues and market dues, local governments do not have a strong local revenue tax
base from which to get financial resources to co-finance the NAADS, and later on to
facilitate the monitoring of the program. This is a serious problem that will require urgent
attention if decentralization of agricultural extension is to become sustainable.
Despite the increased administrative decentralization, local governments are still
faced with low human capacity to plan and implement government programs. Lastly,
local government authorities have been less keen to facilitate the implementation of
NAADS activities, and where they have done so, it is only an individual effort (e.g., the
community development officers) and not as a team at the local level. This problem will
require a broader mandate coordinated across the line ministries or agencies of
agriculture and local government to devise ways of ensuring local government authorities
pay attention to NAADS as they do for other government programs running at the local
level.
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With respect to the NAADS design, there are challenges at varying layers of the
organizational structure. At the lowest level, there are some concerns of the poor quality
of services provided by the service providers. This problem partly stems from the absence
of well trained, although qualified individual PSPs. Individual PSPs require re-tooling in
terms of the skills required to deal with the complex problems in rural areas.
There is weak monitoring of the program, particularly by the program
beneficiaries themselves. Some farmers pay less attention to reporting on the progress of
the activities of the PSPs, although there are situations where farmers’ groups have held
PSPs accountable and thus taken actions to nullify contracts and in some cases asked the
PSPs to refund the funds.
The problem of delayed disbursement of NAADS funds is prevalent at the subcounty level. The cause of this problem is “claimed” to be at the district level. There is
need to find out why this is the case. Late disbursing followed by the need to spend
before the end of the fiscal year imply quick and often less efficient contracting
procedures, which may adversely affect the program outcomes.
Despite the establishment of farmers’ groups, there are specific issues that will
need attention with respect to strengthening these institutions. There are challenges in the
management of technology demonstration sites and in the need to strengthen
communication among group members.
The next question is whether the NAADS program is sustainable? We offer
insights to this issue based on the fieldwork results. In terms of fiscal sustainability, the
NAADS budget is largely donor funded and this raises the question of whether the
government of Uganda will reduce on the borrowing to finance the NAADS program by
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scaling up on the portion of domestic resources earmarked to the NAADS program? This
is dependent on how fast the transformation of the agricultural sector from subsistence to
commercial levels happens, and whether the required marketing systems and value
addition beyond agro-processing but toward some “sort of agro-manufacturing” (e.g.,
fruit canning) become a reality. The good news is that farmers are paying their cofinance; but the bad news is that local governments are not co-financing their required
obligations. Moreover, despite the government’s commitment to continued financing of
NAADS, there has been difficulty for the government to increase its spending to the
agricultural sector, citing the ceiling of the MTEF.
How then do we strengthen decentralization of agricultural extension with
inadequate fiscal capacity? There is an urgent need of addressing the local fiscal
capacities of sub-governments if they are to take charge of decentralized extension. Local
governments have no major tax sources from which they can generate resources to cofinance the NAADS program. Moreover, it is not sustainable for the government to
continue providing compensations for the elimination of the gradated taxes and market
dues, which were the main sources of tax revenues to local governments. It is also
unlikely that farmers will shoulder the financial burden of local governments. Farmers
are themselves in a great need of support in terms of marketing support to promote their
activities. At the same time the central government can continue to channel earmarked
transfers to support NAADS.
In terms of human resources, there is a thin structure of program managers at the
district and sub-county level. NAADS managers at the lower levels of government
perform many tasks that the quality/effectiveness of their activities may be compromised.
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This has had implications on the monitoring of NAADS activities in the light of a limited
budget. Typically, at the sub-county, the NAADS sub-coordinator and the community
development officer are the only officials engaged actively in NAADS activities. Support
from other local government officials is limited. This problem must be addressed through
coordination of NAADS activities by the MoLG and MFPED.
With respect to institutional and social sustainability, the NAADS program has
revamped the farmers’ organizations in Uganda. NAADS farmers’ groups are active in
deciding what to choose for investment and they take the lead in the selection of PSPs to
deliver contracted extension. Farmers’ groups have united farmers and created a forum
for bargaining. However, farmers need further guidance in making the right enterprise
choices.
Generally, advisory information on marketing of agricultural produce seems to be
limited. The farmers we interviewed in the focus group discussions expressed their
dissatisfaction of the competence of most individual and private firms’ advisory services
on marketing of agriculture produce. Despite the NAADS efforts to integrate marketing,
it seems in general that there is until now no clear marketing strategy of farmers’ produce
from the rural areas to the road-side and urban markets.
Coordination of NAADS activities among line ministries must be strengthened.
This coordination will have to embrace the different donor agencies in Uganda’s
agricultural sector. There is need to harmonize the activities to be funded within the
agricultural sector over the medium term and to guide the process of which
responsibilities are handled by the different ministries. The main output from
coordination should be a clear policy on the role of sub-national governments in NAADS
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activities. Our findings reveal that sub-counties consider NAADS activities as being a
secondary responsibility. This is consistent with findings from the NAADS mid-term
reviews. Until now, the NAADS program is not well conceived in local government
structures.
In conclusion, this study finds a statistically significant impact of access to
advisory services under NAADS on the value of farm production per acre. We caution
the reader to recognize that this study did not analyze all the impacts of NAADS on other
agricultural outcomes. In addition, the study suffers from the failure to control for
spillover effects, and other general equilibrium that affect program impacts.
Further research will be needed to confirm this finding and to also find the impact
of the NAADS program on other agricultural outcomes that were not a focus of this
study. Lastly, to the extent that the NAADS program is not the only intervention expected
to improve rural farmers’ livelihoods, there is need to focus on other complementary
interventions to fix the problems of low agricultural productivity in Uganda. To recap the
words of Nkonya et al. ( 2004) there is no “one-size-fits all” solution to the complex
problems of small farmers in the diverse circumstance of rural Uganda.
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MAP 1. NAADS COVERAGE IN UGANDA

Source: National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS).
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APPENDICES
Table A1. Survey Questionnaire [attached in separate file]
Table A2. Unit conversions for computing crop yield

Unit

Code on
Conversion factor:
questionnaire unit to kgs
Kilograms
01
1
Sack (120 kgs)
09
120
Sack (100 kgs)
10
100
Sack (80 kgs)
11
80
Sack (50 kgs)
12
50
Sack (unspecified)
13
20
Jerrican (20 liters)
14
20
Jerrican (10 liters)
15
10
Jerrican (5 liters)
16
5
Jerrican (3 liters)
17
3
Jerrican (2 liters)
18
2
Jerrican (1 liter)
19
1
Tin (20 liters)
20
20
Tin (5 liters)
21
5
Plastic basin (20 liters)
22
20
Kimbo/Cowboy/Blueband Tin (2 kg)
29
1
Kimbo/Cowboy/Blueband Tin (1 kg)
30
0.5
Kimbo/Cowboy/Blueband Tin (0.5 kg)
31
0.25
Basket (20 kg)
38
20
Basket (10 kg)
39
10
Basket (5 kg)
40
5
Heap (unspecified)
65
1.5
Bundle (unspecified)
67
1
Bunch (Big)
68
15
Bunch (Medium)
69
10
Bunch (Small)
70
7
Cluster (unspecified)
71
2
Number of units (general)
86
Depends on crop*
Source: Uganda National Bureau of Statistics. Code extracted from UNHS 1999/00.
* Across the study sites certain crops such as cabbages, pineapples, water melons, and
paw paws were harvested in varying sizes. To capture this variation, data on Weights of
these crops was collected from three different markets within each study sub-county and
for each crop I sampled the small, medium and large taking the average weight for a
particular sub-county over the same crops.
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Table A3. Procedure and data used to compute sampling weights

Sampling Weights for non-NAADS households in the non-NAADS district

Equal the number of households in the entire district divided by the number of
household sampled. Each farmer gets the same weight
Sampling Weights for non-NAADS households in non-NAADS sub-counties in
NAADS districts

Equals the number of non-NAADS households in non-NAADS sub-counties in
the district divided by the number of non-NAADS households sampled in this sub-county
MULTIPLIED by the ratio: the number of non-NAADS households in non-NAADS subcounties in the six NAADS districts divided by the number of non-NAADS households
in non-NAADS sub-counties in the three selected NAADS districts.

Sampling Weights for non-NAADS households in NAADS sub-counties in NAADS
districts

Equals the number of non-NAADS households in all the NAADS sub-counties in
the district divided by the number of non-NAADS households sampled in this sub-county
MULTIPLIED by the ratio of the number of non-NAADS households in NAADS subcounties in the six NAADS districts divided by the number of non-NAADS households
in NAADS sub-counties in the three selected NAADS districts.

Sampling Weights for NAADS households in NAADS sub-counties in NAADS districts

Equals the total number of NAADS households in the district divided by the
number of NAADS households in NAADS sub-counties in NAADS districts sampled
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MULTIPLIED by the total number of NAADS households in all six NAADS districts
divided by the total number of NAADS households in the three selected districts.

District level data
District (i)
Total # of hhs in district (a)*
Total # hhs living in NAADS SCs
(b)*
Estimated # hhs participating in
NAADS (c )**
Estimated # of hhs not participating
in NAADS but live in NAADS SCs
(d=b-c)***
Estimated # of hhs not participating
in NAADS in non-NAADS SCs (e
=a-b)***
Estimated # of non-NAADS hhs in
district (f=d+e)***

Mukono
187967
181507

Kabale
95071
60491

Tororo
80334
41120

Arua
151851
79355

Soroti
70455
60687

Kibaale
85038
83902

Kayunga
62039
0

Total
732755
507062

31968

39114

8226

27450

21726

21636

0

150120

149539

21377

32894

51905

38961

62266

0

356942

6460

34580

39214

72496

9768

1136

62039

163654

155999

55957

72108

124401

48729

63402

62039

582635

Sources: * UBOS’s population census; ** NAADS Secretariat; and *** Authors’
Computations.
Sub-county level data
District (i)
Selected NAADS Sub-counties
Total # of hhs living in selected NAADS sub-county
in district "I" (g)*
Estimated # of hhs participating in NAADS within a
NAADS sub-county (h)**
Estimated # of hhs not participating in NAADS but
live within a NAADS sub-county (k=g-h)***
Number of NAADS hhs sampled in study (m)***
Number of non-NAADS hhs within NAADS SC
sampled (n)***
Selected non-NAADS sub-counties
Total # of hhs living in selected non-NAADS subcounty in district "I" (o)*
Number of sampled hhs living in selected nonNAADS sub-county (p)***
Selected non-NAADS SC in non-NAADS district
Total # of hhs living in selected non-NAADS SC in
non-District (q)*
Number of households sampled (r )***

Mukono
Kasawo
6683

Kabale
Kyanamira
3976

Tororo
Kisoko
2927

1764

1268

1044

4919

2708

1883

44
25

44
19

40
23

Ntunda
3025

Kaharo
3635

Paya
6549

20

18

18

Kayunga

13209

Kangulumira
9453
51

Sources: * UBOS’s population census; ** NAADS Secretariat; and *** Authors’
Computations.
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Table A4. Average price data of selected crops grown in the study sites.

Crop name
matooke-food type
matooke-beer type
matooke-sIet type
maize
finger millet
sorghum
rice
beans
field peas
cow peas
pigeon peas
ground nuts
soya beans
sim-sim
cotton
irish potatoes
sIet potatoes
cassava
coffee
tea
tobacco
trees
flowers
oranges
passion fruits
pineapples
mangoes
pawpaw
other fruits
onions
cabbages
dodo
tomatoes
carrots
other vegetables
vanilla
Source: Author.

Tororo
619
214

980
567

500
233
200

Kabele
764
311
467
450
373
793
600
467

Mukono
560
71
400
323
583
417
1083
1100

1233

867
300
1960
550
1150

190
117
500

367
278
311
700

250
683
253
147

110
717
217
77

300
1267
233

433

340
800
350
187
103
450

167
83
1533
143
300
1333

1033
358
131
1058
317

2667
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Table A5. Summary data on (PSP) contracts in NAADS study sites (Kasawo subcounty)
Kasawo sub-county in Mukono district.
Year of
Type (s) of Enterprise PSP company
contract

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05

Bananas
Vanilla

KasimI Consults
Uganda marketing serv

Coffee
Diary cattle I
Diary cattle II
Diary cattle bull
scheme establishment

Rocagric
Rocagric
Manpower associates
Rocagric

Local chicken
Piggery
Diary Cattle
Diary cattle/bull
scheme establishment
Vanilla
Goat
Vegetable I
Vegetables II

Green Pastures
Rocagric
Manpower Associates
Rocagric

Piggery
Local chicken
Diary Cattle
Vanilla post harvest

Contract value
(1 U.S. dollar
=1800 Uganda
Shillings )

Contract duration
(days)

Status of contract/Remark on quality of services

4444

132
132
119
77
77
44

Completed- not satisfactory
Terminated-not satisfactory. Inability to complete
assignment
Completed-satisfactory and good
Completed-satisfactory and good
Completed-satisfactory and fair
Completed-satisfactory and good

88
88
99
44

Completed-satisfactory and fair
Completed-satisfactory and good
Not completed-delayed implementation
Completed-satisfactory and good

88
77
66
77

Completed-satisfactory and good
Completed-not satisfactory
Not completed-delayed implementation
Not completed-delayed implementation-time
elapsed

110

Completed-not satisfactory-poor quality of pig
structures-but training was okay.
Completed-not satisfactory-poor quality
Completed-satisfactory-fair
Completed-not satisfactory-poor quality of
structures and poor training

4444
3889
2528
2528
2406

Rocagric
Manpower Associates
Banda quality pdts
Green World Environment
Consult

2889
6484
3250
3190
2889
2528
2167
2501

Agrovet Ltd
PASSATA (U) Ltd
PASSATA (U) Ltd
AWA Global ltd

3611
3611
3613
3057

Source: Author

110
110
88
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Table A6.Summary data on (PSP) contracts in the NAADS study sites (Kisoko subcounty)
Kisoko sub-county in Tororo district
year
Type of enterprise

Name of PSP

2002/03

AGRUDAS

2002/03
2002/03
2002/03
2002/03
2002/03
2003/04
2003/04

Commercial pig
production
Local chicken
improvement
Pineapple production
Goat management
Banana production
Groundnuts
production/improvement
Pig production
Groundnuts production

2003/04

Local Poultry
Management

2003/2004

Soya bean production

2003/2004
2004/2005
2004/2005
2004/2005
Source: Author

Groundnuts production
Groundnut production
Local Chicken
Improvement
Pig production

Contract duration
(days)
110

Amount (1 UD
=1800 UgShs)
2632

AGRUDAS

132

Individual
Individual
Individual
ROMTEC (firm)

88
132
110
132

Individual
Tororo Women Uplift
ltd (firm)
Tororo District
Farmers Association
(TODIFA)
Individual

70
64

3757
1526
3200
2528
3552
1733

Status of contract/remarks on quality of services
Terminated due to untimely implementation. However, quality
was fair.
Terminated due to untimely implementation.
Completed but delayed due to delayed flow of funds
Completed but delayed due to delayed flow of funds
Completed but delayed due to delayed flow of funds
Completed a season later due to low financial capacity of PSP
and slow release of NAADS funds
Completed according to schedule-quality very good
Completed according to schedule-quality very good

1960
120

Terminated due to slow implementation and poor quality of
demonstration sites
3611

110

Individual
Individual
RUDI (firm)

97
100
120

RAVE (firm)

100

2489
3474
3422
4221
3392

Completed but a cropping season later due to poor germination
of demonstrations in the 1st season
Completed well in time-very good quality of work
On-going-good progress
On-going, good progress
On-going, good progress
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Table A7.Summary data on (PSP) contracts in the NAADS study sites (Kyanamira subcounty)
Kyanamira sub-county in Kabale district
year
Type of enterprise
Name of PSP
2002/2003

Irish potato production
and management
2002/2003
Fish pond farming
2002/2003
Temperate fruits
management
2002/03
Irish potato production
2002/03
Management of Small
animals
2002/03
Coffee management
2004
Mushroom growing
2004
Irish Potato Production
2005
Apple Growing and
Management
2005
Management of meat
goats
Irish potato production
Fish pond farming
Goat management
Source: Author.

Kigezi Service
network
Individual
Individual

Contract duration
(days)
5 months
2 months
8 months

Kigezi service network
Rural Agric Services
Support Company
FODRA Holding ltd
Prominent services
Individual
Denta services ltd

143 days
3 months

Sunshine protects ltd

66 days

6 months
4 months
110 days
88 days

Amount (1 USD
=1800 UgShs)

Status of contract/remarks on quality of services
Completed-status satisfactory and good quality

2230
1239
3213
4892
3323
3246
2369
7139

Incomplete-but satisfactory performance
Completed-satisfactory-good quality
Completed-satisfactory performance
Not satisfactory
Not satisfactory-poor quality of services
Not satisfactory
Completed-satisfactory-good quality
Completed but not very good quality

3083

Firm
Individual
Firm

36 days
88
88 days

Completed-satisfactory
6458
3273
3036
5237

Completed-good job done-satisfactory quality
On-going with good progress
On-going with good progress
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Table A8. First stage regression results from 2SLS.
tof
agrocl2
agrocl3
Average rainfall for the period 2004-2005.
Dummy for near period market (1 = near market)
Near feeder road (1 = near road; 0 otherwise)
Land in acres (logarithm)
Square of land in acres (logarithm)
Logarithm of farm equipment
Logarithm of household assets
Education of the household head in years of schooling
Logarithm of age of household head
Household size
Dependency ratio
Access to credit (1= access to credit; 0 otherwise)
Sex of household head (1 = male;0 = female)
Whether household has had a sick member
Whether household participated in local elections
Political connections of the farmer
Whether farmer is satisfied with management of subcounty authorities management
Quality of development plan
Communication and Accountability
Local Revenue Performance
Constant
R-Squared
Number of Observations
Source: Author.

Coef.
-3.102
3.222
-0.177
0.023
-0.055
0.041
-0.001
0.017
-0.025
0.018
0.214
0.047
0.099
0.154
-0.036
0.016
0.156
-0.024
0.060

Std. Err.
0.312
0.333
0.016
0.051
0.059
0.058
0.020
0.025
0.023
0.006
0.098
0.061
0.126
0.056
0.067
0.049
0.123
0.075
0.068

P-value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.661
0.358
0.475
0.960
0.487
0.274
0.006
0.029
0.438
0.433
0.006
0.598
0.754
0.206
0.749
0.373

-10.272
2.048
1.142
21.625
0.4863
266

1.259
0.320
0.188
2.167

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
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Table A9. Sub-county fixed effects

Type of farmer
Near market dummy
Near road dummy
Availability of land
Land squared
Availability of land
Household wealth
Education level of household head
Age of household head
Household size
Dependency ratio
Availability of credit
Sex of the household head
Whether any household member is sick
Awareness of local voting processes
Political connectivity
Whether satisfied with sub-county
management
Constant
Number of observations
R-squared
Source: Author.

Coef.
0.280
-0.088
-0.060
-1.540
0.079
0.084
0.148
-0.016
-0.185
0.183
0.017
0.056
0.109
-0.006
-0.002
-0.208

Std. Err.
0.121
0.097
0.112
0.109
0.037
0.046
0.044
0.012
0.186
0.115
0.238
0.106
0.127
0.093
0.233
0.141

0.094
10.610
266
0.71

0.128
0.931
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